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PREFACE
The ma1n purpose ot the thesia 1. to describe and compare the a tti tude ot Duns Scotus and Le1 bn! z toward the tamous ontolog1cal argument ot St. Anselm tor the existence ot God.

'l'he

thesis shows that both Scotus and Leibniz emphasize two main
points:

(1) that the basic 1nsight ot the ontolog1cal argument is

valid, namely that it i. the prerogative ot the Divine aeing alone
that He exist, provided only that He be possible; and (2) that the
possibility ot God means that the Divine Being or Essenee is in
aome manner conceivable by us without a contradiction; but Scotua,
claiming that Anselm assumed God's possibility, and Leibn1z, claim
ing the same ot Descartes, attempt to prove that God i8 possible.
Scotua' proot. ot the possibility ot God are:

first, an analY8is

at the concept ot Infinite Being; secondly, an appeal to the experience ot intellect and will which seek the Infinite Good; and
thirdly, an
cy.

~

eosteriori proot of God's possibility from .tricien-

Although this last proot does not enter explicitly into hi.

re-doing of Anselm's argument, it is not contrary to Scotistic
principles to combine the
Anselm's argument.

~

pOlteriori proof with the re-doing of

Leibnizts proofs of God'. possibility which
iii

iv
enter into his re-doing of Anselm's argument are:

first, an anal-

ysis or the ooncept of Being possessing all simple perfeotions;
and seoondly, an

~

posteriori proof from oontingency that the

Necessary Being is possible.

In the A Eosteriorl arguments of

Sootus and Leibnlz for God 'e possibility, we find that they begin
with

th~

-.pprehenslon of being or eesence as real wi thout begin-

ning with existing things as existing.

Scotus and Leibnlz, then,

offer us a complex justitication that we can know the possibility
of God and that we oan inter Godls existence trom His possibility.
The ph1loaophioal problems which we discuss in the last chapter
are:

"Can we know the possibility ot God?

And if

gue trom Hia possibility to Hia actual existence?"

80,

can we ar-

TABLE OF

CO~TTENTS

Chapter
I.

II.

Page

SOOT US • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The context ot the re-doing of Anselm'a argument-God'. existence not known through itself tor us .... •
Demonstration of God'a possIbIlIty and actualIty
trom etficiency--The proofs ot Infin1ty--The redoing of Anselm'. argument--The possibIlIty ot
God--The aotuality ot God--The pure perfeotions.
LEIBNIZ

• • • • • •

•

• • • • • •

• • • • • • • •

1

35

Summary of Anaelm and D.scart.s--Establlshlng the
possIbility ot God--By presumptlon--By proot trom
oontingency--By ~ eriori analysis--Establl$b1ng
God's actual existenoe.
III.

OOMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF SOOTUS,AND LEIBNIZ

•

ProvIng the possibility ot God--By analysis ot
the oonoept--8y reterring to oontingent being-Interenoe trom the possibilIty ot God to Hi. actual existenoe.

v

51

OHAP'I'EB I

SOO'.rus
The best Manner in which to understand what Scotus
acoomplishes in his re-doing or the ontological argument of St.
Anselm ia to exwmine the re-doing in its context.

Scotua colora l

or re-does the ontological argument in the Oxford OOMm!ntar! ~
the 3entenoes 2 and in his Treltise ~ the First Principle.) We
will use the Oxford Oommentarx because the re-doing i. eBsentially
the same in both works and because the Oxford Oomment8.1"1 makes
more reterences to Anselm.
In Book I, Distinotion II, Question I, at the Oxford
OommentarY, acotus asks:

-Whether there is among beings something

existing actually IntinIte,.4

In Question II, he askss

·Whether

1 OrdiQltI0 JOanni!SDuna Scotl, Opera OmnIa, ed. P.
Carolo Balic, Vatican City. 19 0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208-209:
·Per illud poteat colprarl ilIa ratio Anselmi de summo bono
oogltabI11 •••• M Hereafter referred to as Ordlnat~Q.
Z Ordlnat!o, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2;

II, 125-215.

3 Evan Roche, 'lb& R! Primo Prinolpio .2!
Bcotu., St. Bonaventure, 1:!., 1949.

~ ~

4 Ord!natlg, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 125.
unless otherwi.e indicated.

My translatIon

1

2
~t

is known through

its~lt

that an infinite being, i.e., God,

exists?·'
lbe method ot Scotus is summarized in tive steps:
~irst,

the question is proposed; secondly, arguments against the

janswer which Seotus will give are proposed, thirdly, in a contl'a,
~cotus
~ive;

quotes some authorities to support the answer that he will
fourthly, he giveR his own answer to the question; and

~ifthly,

step.

he answers the arguments that were proposed in the second

This five-step method of Scotus is applied to the

questions,as follows:

abov~

two

first, he gives the first three steps tor

Ruestion II then he gives the first three steps tor Question II;
then be proceed.• to give the fourth and fifth steps to Question
II; 6 and tinally be gives the tourth and fifth steps to Question I.
Jed 'a

ExlJterl"~e

!! !2!.

ISnown 'tbt:ough Itself !!z y.!

In the treatment ot Question II, in the second step
wherein objections are proposed, Scotus proposes as an argument
the opinion ot St. Anselm that the existence ot God is known

through itself:
Further, that existence than which nothing greater can be
thought i8 known through itself; God is of this kind, according to Anselm, Pro.logion, ohapter 5; therefore ~d's exist-

5

Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 2; II, 128.

6 Ord1natlq, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 131. Scotus answera
the second question first, because be wishes to dAtermine the way
ot knowing God's existence before he determines if he oan know
God'. existenoe.

.3

Lthan

ence 1s known through !tseltl. But that
which nothing
greater can be though!! 1s not something finite, therefore it
1s infinite. The major is proven, because the opposite ot thE
pred1cate is repugnant to the sUbject: tor it it does not
exist, it would not be that than whioh nothing greater can be
thought, because if it vere in reality, it would be great,r
than if it were not in reality but only in the intelleot.
~ootus

has made it clear that An.elmts greatest conceivable object,

that than which nothIng greater cnn be thought, should be considered as the infinite being.

~bis

is the only text where SCOtu8

explIcitly makes that identification.

In the re-doing ot Anselm'.

argument J Scotus only implies that the starting point should be
considered as infinite being.
~nt

The point of raising Anselm's argu-

here is tha t his argument makes the exis tenoe of God known

tm-ough Itselt.

Por it would be a contradiotion that existence not

Ibe predicated of that than whioh nothing greater can be thought,
because then the greatest oonoeivable object would exist only in
the intellect and hence would not be the greatest conceivable obJect.

For it is greater to exist both in reality and in the intel-

lect than in the intelleot alone.
Atter Scotus has proposed the first three stepl of both
Question I and Question II, he prooeeds to ana WEII' Question II
IWhether the proposition Q.qg.
swer is tha t

~s

is known through itself.

The an-

I

Therefore this LYropositionl Qgg l,s or ~ essence!! is

7 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 2;

II, 129.

4
known th~ough itself, because those terms are suited to make
evident the fact ot thei~ combination to anyone who p0rtect1y
apprehends the terms ot that combina tion, because existence
is apPaicable to no thing mO~8 perfectly than to this essence.
Fo~

anyone who perfectly apprehends the divine essence, the

sition QQS 11. is known through itself.

E~t

SEt.!!2.i.!..

propo~

However, Soo'!"

tus immediately adds that no concept whioh we concelve of God can
~ake

the proposition 'tod 1., known through itself for us:
But It it is asked if existenoe 18 in any concept whioh we
conceive ot God, so that such a proposition 1s known through
itself in whioh existence is predioated of such a conoept
(tor example, ot such a proposition whose extremes can be
conceived by us: there can be in our intsllect some concept
pred1cated ot God whioh is not oommon to God Himselt and to
c~eaturea, suoh conoepts as the necessary being or the inti~
nIta being or the highest good); and lIt it is asked whethey
ot such a conoept~ oan predioate exlstence in that way in
which
eoncepll is oonceiv~d Lio that the proposition God
.1! is known through itselY, I anewer that no such LPropos1tlon! is known through itself • • • ~

Zthe

The reason Is, 3cot1l8 continues, that:

thA concept is not true in itself', unless the parts ot the
concept are united. And Juet as it is necessary to know in
~J1dditntive predioations that the parts ot the ooncept are
able to be united quidditatively, such that one part contains
the other part torm.ally, so also 1s it neO~8sa~ to~ the
truth of a proposition which predicates existence tha t we
should know that the parts ot iss concept ot the subject or
predlcate are a.otually un! ted.
On the basis of' theae texts, it i9 clear that tor Sco tua no propo-

sition predicating existence ot God is known through itselt by us

8 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 138.
9 Ord1natio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 141-142.
10

Grdlnatig. 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II,

141-142.

from the concepts ot Infinite being, necessary

b~lng,

or highest

good, because we do not know that th6 parts of these ooncepts are

aotually united.

We do not know that &ntln&te and be1ng are aotu-

ally united.

ScotUIJ then eonslders the

a.t-~ment

ot Axl&elm..

It was

proposed as an objectIon that that being than which nothing great-

er can be thought is known through i tsel£ ..

:Jaotus answez-8 thi&

objeotion by explaininG that Anselm does not say that such a pz-op.
osition 1s known t~ough Itselt. ll Sootu8 notes, on the one hand,
that the proposition, -that being than which nothing greater can

be thOUght does eXist,· 18 false it it Is held to be known through
itself; and on the

hand, that such a prop~~itlon 18 true although not known through Itself. 12 Sootus has two reasons fop
holding that the proposition i8 not known through itselt. l ) FiPet.
oth~r

it 18 not e..,1dent through itself that the opposite ot the predi-

cate 1s repugnant to the SUbject.

That 18, It 18 not evident

through 1tselt that nsm-txlstmoe i . x-epugnant to tb.all being than

which nothing areater .!.!D. ll! thousbt.

Secondly, lt i8 not evldent

througb itself that the parts of the ooncept of the subject are

actually united.

That 18, it i8 not ev1dent througb ltaelf that

11

OrdiD!tlQ. 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 145.

12

Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2. II, 146.

13 .!21i.

6
Ithat be1ng and that than wbi,oh nothing sreater oan
(great!a~ co~oeivlb!e)

are aotually united.

.2!. t;ho\!&!lt 1 ••••

Those are the tvo

reasons of Scotus tor holding that Anselm's proposition, -that
being than which nothing greater oan be thought does exist," 1.
not known through Itselt.
Since ScotUB has explicitly ldentified Anselm'. greatest
conceivable object with the notion of infinite being,. we can paraphrase the two reasons tor holding that Anselm's proposition Is
not known through itselt.

First, it is not evident through

1t~.1~

that Don-existlnc! Is repugnant to the not1on ot lot1n1t! beIng.

pew

Seoon.dly. 1 t 1. not evident through 1 tselt that infinite and
are actually unIted.

It Is slgnificant to make thia paraphrase

because 1n the re-doing of Anselmts argument ScotUI shows that
those two posit1ons are to be held a8 perluaalvalr proven:
that

IDt1elt~

!Dd b.eiSS

~

first,

9omRoa.i bl e • that 1s, that there i.

quidditative being in the concept of infinite being, and .econdly.
that the

Int1~tI

b,e1,BS 11!!!! Glj1 a i, that ls, mua t bave being or

existence, sinoe it ia a contradict1on to its essence to be caused
by another.

Scotus, therefore, will persuas1vel1 prove the two

poInts which were asaumed in the objeotion to be ev1dent through
thems el ve s.
Sootus bas oompleted hi. answer to Question II.

Ue be-

gins his anaver to Question I by conoluding from the prevIous d1scusslon that the existence ot the lnflnlte being 1s not demonstrable

'~erau1d

with respect to

WI» a.lth?U~h

from the na turf)

o~

7
the terms the proposition the 1.Qtinite beins Iliata is demonstrable RroRter Quld.

But the proposItion oan be d.emona trated tor ua

by a demonstration .9J&1!. from creatures, since from the existence

ot one relative, such

as

etteot, we oan tmmediately conclude to

the existence at its correlative, the cause.
answer into two articlea*

SoOtu8 divides hi.

Article I demonstrating the existence

(e.II.) or the relatiye nroRel't1!1 ot the inf1n1te being !"rom oreatures. Article II demonstrating the existence (.ws.) ot the

!11H. beia

tl-Oll the relative propertie.

~!mon!tratign ~

Gog'l PQI,lb\l&tx

J.D.t1-

ot the infinite being.14

~ Aqty!~lt% ~

Article I 1. divided into three partsl

Ett191encI

firat, a three-

fold conclusion that there 1. aotually among beings some effective
cause Which is simply first. that there i8 same being which is
simply firat with re.pcet to finality, and that there i. some being which i. simpl1 first with respect to eminence, secondly, that
all three primacies must exist in the same being; and thirdl7,

that the triple primacy can exist in only one k!,nd of nature. 1S

The tirst part of Article I which proves that there must
exist the three primacies ot etfioiency. finality, and eminence i.
divided accordingly into three proofs, each proof having three
similar steps:

for example, 1, Scotl!S starts with the possibl11t,.

14 Org1.nata1Q, 1, d. 2,
lS Ord!n-,10, 1, d. 2,

q. 1-2,

II, 148-149.

q. 1-2; II, 14.9-1$0.

8
of something being effected and arrives at the possibility ot a
first ettective cause; 2, then he shows that the first possible
effective oause is totally unoausable, and "

tinally he shows

that the first possible efteotive cause must actually exist. 16
We wish to make two comments on this aspeot ot possibility.

First, we wish to explain why Scotus starts with the possi-

bility ot something being erteoted.

Scotus does sO 1n order to

tulfill bis requirements tor a demonstration.

Alan Wolter ex-

plains that there are tour oonditions whioh the conolusion ot a
demonstration must fultlll. 17 First, the o onclus lon must be
tain; oonsequently the premises must be certain.

0. . .

Probable prem-

ises oannot give the certainty require4 in scientitio knowledge;
probable premlses give only opinion.
must be a

n~cessary

truth.

Seoondly, the conolusion

Thirdly, the conclusion must not be

immediately -evident but lmown by reason ot other neoessary and
evident truths.
the premis...

And tourthly, the oonclusion mWlt be oaused b,.
It 1s the th1rd cond1tion, that the oonolusion be

known trom neoessary and evident truths, whioh requires Seotus to
argue troM the possibility rather than the actualit,. of something
being etrected.

Sootus tells us thatt

I oould indeed argue that some nature ia produced because
same subject undergoes a ohange and therefore the term ot the

16

0rdlna~1Q,

1. d. 2, q. 1-2. II. 151-165.

17 Alan Wolter, "The 'Theologlsm' ot Duna Scotus."
Franciscan Studia8.• VII. 19k7. 265.

9

change oomes into existenoe ~n the subject. and cODa.~uentl~
this term or the composite Li.e. the sUbject and ter:!V are
produced or effected. Henoe by the nature ot the correlativea, some eftioient caua. exists. Formulated in thls rashlon, this tirst ar~t would be based upon a oontingent but
manitest proposition.

Any conolusion derIved trom the contIngent proposItion that some
thing is being etfected would not be scientifio knowledge.
wanta to start with the truth of a
whioh

o~nnot

ohange.

neoess~y

Scotua

proposition. a truth

Be continues:

However to pro.e our conclusion the argument can be retormulated 1n such a way that it proceeda trom neoessArY premis.s.
Thus it is tN. that 80me nature is able to be produced,
therefore someth1ng i. able to produoe an etrect. The antecedent is proved trom the tact thl t something can be changed.
tor samething is possible ("po.sible" being def1ned as contra~ to "neces8ary").
In thIs ca.e, the proof tor the first
conclusion prooeeds tram what the thins ls or trO!9its possible existence, but not trom ita aotual existence.
It is not olear 1n Scotusts ahort explanat10n why the premise about the possibility ot somethIng being efteoted is a neoessary
truth.

Hi. point is that the aotual existenoe of same thing being

etfeoted is contingent whereas what the thing ls. the possibl1ity
or essenoe ot the thina. is neoessary_

To show wbJ thi. possibil-

ity 1s neoessary, we can read this text trom the Pr!!I Leetura ot
Scotua'
Likewise I Sa1 that although things other than God are aotual.
ly contingent in respeot ot their actual existence, in r.~
.pect ot their possible existenoe they are necessary; .a although that a man exist 1s contingent, it 1s necessary tb~t
18

Ord~nat12,

19

Ordlnatl0. 1. d. 2, Ch 1-2; II, 162.

1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 161-162.

10

he i. possible, because it does not include a contradiction
to be something; therefore it is neoessary that something
other than God is posslbl., because being is divided into the
possible and the necessary, and aa the necessary being has
necessity, sOZahe possible being haa possibility tram 1ts own
quiddity. ••
.
It is necessary that a man 1s possible because there i. no contradiction in the quiddity ot man.

FOr the possible being has it.

possibility fram its own quiddity.
about the possibility ot

so~th1ng

By proceeding tram a premis.
being ertected, Scotua starts

with a necessary premise which w111 give a necessary conclusion:
the possibility ot something being caused requires the possibility

ot the first unoausable effioient caus. because ot the impos.1bilitl and unintelligibility or an intinitl or essentially ordered
cau.es~ 21

In our seoond comment, we wish to examlne the movement

from the possibilIty or the rirst, uncausable, errectlve cause to
Ita actual existence.

Sootus argues that the flrst, poSSible,

ettectlve cause must exist ot ltselt since it ls repugnant to the
nature ot the rirst errectlve to be caused by anotherl

Proot: Anlthing to who.e natm-e It is repugnant to receive
existence from something else, exists ot itself it it is able
to exist at all. To receive existence from something else,
however, is repugnant to the very notion ot a being which is
first 1n the order or effic1ency, as is clear from the second
conclusion Shich shows ~hat th. first possible etteotive
eaus. MUst be uncausablJl. That it can exist, 18 also clear

"The

Krtm!

20
~, Ood"Wa. 1449, t.8b, quoted by Wolter,
tTheo10gi~~t~ootus,· Pr,!9clsqan Stud!.!, VII, 371.
Zl

Or4inatlg, 1, 4. ·2, q. 1-2; II, 151-161.

11
tJtom the first concl~s on ,LWhlch shows that the first effective caUSe is possib e • •• From all this 1t follows that
an efficient cause vh ch 1s first in an unqualified sense ot
the term can exist of itself. Oonsequently, it does exist ot
1tselt, tor what doe. not act~lly exist of 1tself, is incapable ot existing of 1tse1t. 22
There are tvo way. that a being may

be

as-producible or possible-as-existent.

possiblel

either possible-

Either the quIddlty can be

caused to ex1st, or the quiddit7 must exist of itselt.

Since the

first P088ible ettective cause mus t be unoausable, its quiddity
must exist of itself.

Por the only way in which its possibility,

whioh was already proven, oan be not contradioted ia that tbe
firat possible effective cause ex1st ot itself.

We sball see lat-

er that Sootua will reter to this movement from possibility to
aotuality vben be re-does the ontological argument.
The second part ot Article I proves that the first ettec
tive cause must also be the first tinal cause and the supreme nature. 2 )

Then the third part of Article I proves that there can be

only one kind of nature to which the triple primaoy of efficiency.
finality. and eminenoe is applicable. 24 Later in Book I, Distinotion 2, Question 3, ScotU8 shows that there can be numerically
only one being which possesses the specific nature ot the triple

22

Ord1natlQ, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 164..16$.

23

2tdinatlo, 1, d.-2, q. 1-2; II, 169-171.

24 0r4Inat19, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 171-173.

12
pr1mao,..25
Thl ~oqt.l

.it lnr1B1 tt
In Article II, Scotua proposes to show that the one na-

ture posaessing the triple primac,. is the intln1 t. being.

He be-

gins by showing that the first efticient has intellect and will,
that hi. understanding i8 his essence, and that hi. esaenoe i.
representatiYe ot an infinite number ot Objeot •• 26

He

tben oon-

c1udes with tour arguments that the fIrst being is infinite:

a)

trom the fact that the first being 1s the first ettioient cause ot
all other things, b) trom the taot that the first being has knowledge ot an infinite number of things, 0) from the fact that the
firs t being is the ultimate end, and d) hom the fact that the
first being is the supreme nature. 27
We vi11 now _ke a close examination of the third and
fourth proofs ot intini t'1 because it 1s in their oontext that Sootua r8-d08. the ontological argument of Anselm.
Sootus otters this short proof tor the infinity of the
first being fram finalit,.:
Our will can alwa"s loye and seek something greater than an,.
finite being, even as OUP intellect 1s alwa,.. able to know
more. And, what is more, there .eem. to be III natUl'al inclination to love an infinite good to the greateat degree pos.!.

2> 0,.dinat12, 1, d. 2, q. .3; II, 222-244.
26

Qrd,lnatlsb 1, d. 2, ct. 1-2J II, 174.

Z1 QriinatiSb 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 189.

13
ble, because the free wIll ot itselt and wl thout the aid ot
any habIt promptly and delightfully loves this good. Indeed
It 8eems that the wIll 18 not pertectly sati8fled w1~b anything e18e. And it 8uch an Infinito good were really opposed
to the natural objeot ot the will, ~hy is it that the will
does not naturally hate an inf'lnlte good, just as It naturally hates non-existenoe L according to AugustIne in De l!bero
arb11i12. III, y111' For it seems that it 1I1ntlnite" and
Igoo
were incompatlble, then there would be no way in which
the will could be satlsf1ed .in such a good, nOr could it
readl1y tend towards anythIng which Is oppose. to It. proper
Ob.'.1t.ct. 'I'lll. argument 11111 be contirmed. in the tollowing by
a islmil8£! 8.l'gument from the 1ntellect. 26
Since Scotua treats the argument trom the !ntellect as a p ....uasly. p1"oot,29 it appears that the argument btom the will ls also a
persuasive proof.

Por the ugumentl btom the intellect and the

wl11 are siml1ar in assumIng compatlbl1ity 8ince incompatibility
18 not apparent.
The purpose ot thIs argument is to show that "InfInity"
i. not incompatible with -800d.o

It °intlnlty· and "good" were

1ncompatible, -lnfin1te good" would be equivalent to non-existence
and

so would be hated. by the will.

Por, as

the w111 naturally hates non-existence.

August~ne

points out,

Since, however, the wl11

actually strives tor infInite good (because It does not rest in
anl finite good), "Infinite" and °good" cannot be incompatible •
.Next, In arguing trom the tact that the supre.e nature

1s most perfect, Scotua use. . . ·analy.l. of concepti to establlsh
&d

••

28 Ordlnatl0, 1. d. 2 .. q. 1-2; II, 205-206,. tpans.
Allan Wolter, ~ 8cotwil Phl10£toRhlcal Wt-I t&ns!h London, 1962,
70-71. The word similar" is not in the LatIn text.
29 Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2J II, 207.
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the possibility of infinite beingt
That to whioh intensive infinity i8 not repugnant 18 not all
perfeot unless 1t be 1nfinite, for to be infinite ia compatible with it. And if it i. f1nite, it can be exoeeded or
excelled. Now infinity is not repugnant to being, therefore
the moat perfect betos 1s infinite. The minor ot this proof
• • • cannot, it seems, be proven ... prior1. POI" JUI t as contradiotoriesbytheir very nature contradict each other and
their opposition oannot be made manifest by a~thing more
evident, so also these terms, viz. ftbeing" and "infinite ft by
their very nature are not repugnant to each other. Neither
does there seem to be any ~1 ot proving this ,except byexplaining the meaning of the notions themselves. ".Being" Cannot be explained by anything better than itself. "Infinitewe understand by meana of finite. I explain "infinite ft in a
popular definitIon as tollows: The infinite ia that Which
exce.ds the finite, not exactly by reason ot any f1nite m'as.
ure, but in exc.ss ot any measure that coUld be assigned.J
The argument 1s that the eminent beins ia that which cannot be excelled.

Now if the most perteot be1ng were finite, then the moat

pertect being could be exoel1ed 1t and only if infinity were composaible with being.
oannot be exoelled.

But

the most pertect being is that which

'rberetore the most perteot being ia not fi-

nite but infinite, it intinity and being are oompos,ible.

The

orucial point ot the argument is the question whether infinity and
being are oompossible.

lbe compatibility ot notes 1n tbea. two

concepts would mean that the thing oonoeived i8 possible.
Scotu8 noted that it oannot be demonstrated A 21"12£1
that infinity is compos sIble with being.

Bettoni otters an ex-

30 Ordinat+ p , 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 206-207, trana.
Wolter. Dun. Sooius, 1-72.

1$
planatlon:)l

We demonstrate a truth A prlor~ when we attain the

truth by a slmple explanation ot the meanlng ot the terms involved. In the almple explanation ot the term. -being" and Rin_
tlnite R we oannot judge that there is a necessary conneotion between the terms.

Thus we oannot judge .. .nr!or1 tba t an intini te

being is possible.

~ut

at least our analysis of the terms ahowa

that there i. no apparent contradiction in the notion ot an Intinite being.
Sootua next tries to show that there oan be no contradiction in the notion ot an intinite being:
The following persuasive argument oan be given tar what
we intend to prove. Just a. evel'7th1ng i. assumed to be po.
aible, it 1ta impossibility 1. not apparent, 80 also all
things are assumed to be compo,sible, i t their non-compos.1bilit~ 1. not manitest.
Now there i. no non-compos.ib11ity
apparent here, tor 1t is not ot the nature ot being to be
tinite, nor does tinite appear to be an attribute ooextens1v
with being. But it they were mutually repugnant, 1t would b
tor one ot thes. reasons. The ooextensive attribute. which
being po.s•• ses aeem to be sufficiently evident. 32
It 1s important to note that this argument ia only called persuaaive.

Scotus is arguins that Just as a thing i8 assumed to be

possible if its impossibility is not apparent, so thoa. things ar
assumed to be oompo.sible it their non-oompo8sibllity 18 not apparent.

Although thi8 i8 an aS8umption, Scotu. believea that it

is not unreasonable.

31 Etfram Bettoni,

~i~ Pbt*g'ODhJ. trans. and ed.
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SootUI notes that there are two cases whlch would show
non-composslbi11 ty between Intini ty and being.

'.I'be tirst cas. is

that the nature ot being might always have to be conceived as tlnite.

Scotus rejects this a1ternatlve because or hls unlvocal

notlon ot being.

For Scotus, belng i8 the proper object of the

human intellect; just a. man may abstract the concept of being
from the senslble aocidents and b1 this ooncept have a conoept ot
substance as being,

10

man ma, abstract the concept ot being trom

finlte being and thus have a ooncept ot being which max be applicable to an infinite being.)3
tion tor Scotua.

Univooit,. of being is an abstpao-

Univooit1 ot being in no way prevents that there

be different m04es of being, among which one is infinite and man,
are flnlte • .34
The .econd case whloh would show non-compossibility between infintty and being would be that flniteness might be an at-

3) Sootua, OommentS;ia Oxonien.i. ad IV. Librol ~
trl S,ntentlaPy)' ed. P.M.P.rcia, 6.'.R., ?forenoe 191 ,-x;-d. ), q. ); I, )8-339. Hereatter reterred to as ~. Oxon••
~ Alan Wolter, O.P.M., The 1~an!0endentall And 1~1~
Punotion In~ Metaahlaloa ot ~~otus, It. SOnaventure, ._,
19Ub, 4S'--WSCOtus, in short;-aaw no contradiction in admittin&
that the term 'belng' can be predicated elther equlvoca11y (ana1agousl,.) o~ univocall, dependlng upon whether it signitie. all
thIngs properlI or not. In the tlrst instance, it signlfies the
Intrinsic mod. as well a. the co~on r,t10 of being and hence bas
&1
many oorrespondi~ oper conoepts as there are intrinsicallY
d trerent c~as~e. or-be nga. ~n the second nstanci, t sIgn riel
thlng. only impertect1y, s1noe the mind abstraot. from the proper
intrlnsic mode.. But In this case we have not several concepts,
but one univocal common concept. n

Pi
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tribute coextensive with being.
sive with being are:

But the only attributes coexten-

one, true, and good, whereas the attribute

tinite-intinii! is a disjunctive attribute ot being.

Scotus ar-

gues:
In the disjunctive attributes, however, vhile the entire dis
junction cannot be demonstrated troM "being", nevertheless a
a universal rule by positing the less pertect extreme ot •
being we can conclude that the more pertect extreme is reallsed in some other beinr. Thus it tollows that it 80me bei
i8 finite, then aome be ng i8 intinite. And it some being i
contingent, then some being i8 neoessary. Por 1n 8uch case.
it is not possible tor the more impertect extreme ot the dis
JURation to be existentially predioated ot "being", partioularly taken, unles8 the more pertect extreme be exiltentia11
veritled ot 80me other being upon which it depends.J5
Alan Wolter points out that this ·universal rule· describes what
may be concluded, not imaediately interred. 36

That i., from the

finite one may conclude by a reasoning process to the infinite.
There is no ex professo analysis ot this "universal rule" by Sootua.

We may suppos. that this "uniyersal rule" is obvious in

.0.

disjunctive attributes, for example, caused-caus., and i. probabl
extended by Sootus to include finite-infinite.

we

may also sup-

pos., as Wolter points out, that Scotus's analysis of the tBplica
tiona ot an essential order shows that where an essential order
ex1sts, one member in a disjunotive attribute must tollow in our
from the other member of th~ diSjunction. 37

Scotus, 8.

35 .22. Oxon., 1,
36 Wolter, The
Wolter

d. 39, q. 1; 1,1214.,

Transcendental~.

137.

Wolter, Duns
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Sinoe Sootua has rejected the two cases whioh would show
non-compo•• ibility between infinity and being, he assumes that infinite being i8 possible.
Scotus otters two more arguments persuasive ot the oompossibility ot infinity and being:
Another perauasive argument adduoed is this. Int1nity
in its own vay, is not opposed to quant1ty (that is, where
parts are taken suooessively); theretore, nel~her 1s infinity, In its own way, opposed to entity (that is, where perteotion exists simultaneously).
Again, 1t the quantity oharacteristic ot power is simpl,
mars pe~feot than that obar~cter1st1c ot_~.a, Wh~iS it .~~.
sible to bave an infinity ~ot small part!! in an Lext~nd.!V
mass and not an infinite power' And if an int1nite power is
possible, then it actually exists, .s is evident from the
third conclusion about the first etf10ient cause, and will
also be proved again later.)6
The

two arguments are essentially this:

an indioation ot intini-

ty is found in quantity where parts are potentially divisible into infinity_

If infinity is possible on the Ie •• perteot 1e..l 01

quantity. then infinity ought to be possible on the more perfect
levels ot being and power, that is, being and effioient oausality_
Soot us believes that it i. possible to have intinite or eternal
movement, an endless motion, and that it is possible to have intlnlte etreots, that Is, an endless number or etrects sucoes.ive11. 39 Now it elther infinity is possible, then the power which il
able to produce such intinlty in quantity successively must be it.

)8 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208, trans.
Duns Scotul. 7~.
39 Or-dina tl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, .190-194_

Wo1t.~,

19
selt int'ini tee

Now auoh an interenoe delignates the power

tinite by extrinsio denom.ination trom the etrects.

8.8

in-

And Scotul

apparently bas no problem arguing that tbat whioh is infinite by
extrinsio denomination is infinite in its being.

Be argue.:

It the First Being at one and the aame time tormall! possea8ed all oausal power, • • • it would be infInIte, becaus•
• • • it has power to produce an infinite number all at onoe,
and the more one oan produce simultaneousl,.., tbe greater the
power in intensity. But it the Pirst Being posseaaet ausb
power in an even more pertect way than if it had it formally,
• • • its intensive infinity tollow8 A tortior~. But the
tull causal power that eacb thing may bave in itself, the
IPir!"t Being posseases even mON pertectly than i t it were
tormally present.
We oan establish naturally the existenoe of' an infinite power which on its part possesses s~ultaneously tbe
tullneaa of caulality and could produce an infinite number 0
things a t e~c., it only they were capable of exis tins s1multaneoualy.'+U
Sinoe the tirst efficient caUSe baa its power independently, it
haa the totality of 1ts eftect 1n its power at
t1me.
bel'

()De

and the a...

And because it has the power otproducing an infinite

n~

ot ettecta at the same time (it thes. things were capable ot

existing simultaneously), the first eff1cient cause i. int1n1te
In It.elf, tbat ls, intensi.ely.41
It wou14 help our understanding to oontrast tba ata1"ting point of the tlrst argument tor the po8s1blllty and existence
ot the First Being with the starting point of the last argument

0

40 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 193-194, trans. Vol
ter, ~ Scotul, 1~.

41

Ord1natio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 190.
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Scotus.

In the

argumen~8

tor the Pirst Being, Scotus starts with

the reality ot essenc •• which is known trom existent changeable
beings.

Seotus does not work with exlstence in the beglnning at

hls premiaes but with the reality at eSSeBce which may very well
exist but which need not be considered aa exIsting.

The

argument

trom the reality at essenee which Is known trom changeable beings
are oonsidered by :Jcotus to be true demonatra tions.

But the ar-

gument we haYe jus t seen is conaidered by Scotua to be onl,. a per

suasion.

Par its starting point 1s the AsaymRtiop that it infin-

ity is posslble on the l.pertect leyel of quantity, then In.tlnitJ'
ought to be poa.ible on the more pertect leyel ot belng and etticient causality.
In the next text, Jaotus oonttnue. hi. analy.is ot the
concept ot int1nlte be1ng and also note. that the intellect eyen
delights 1n trying to know an infinite beingl
Again. why is It that the intellect, whos. obJeot is be
ing, does not tlnd the notion at something intln\te repugnant? Instead ot this, the infinite aeems to be the most
perteot thing we can know. Now it tonal discord so readily
dlspleases the ear-, it would be strange it some intellect 41
not clearly percelve the contradiction between intinite and
Its first object (yiz. being) it such existed. Por it the
d1sagreeable becomes ottensive aa 800n aa 1t 1. peroeived,
why is it that no intellect naturally shr1nks t1"Om the intinltely intelligible a8 it would trom something out pt r..a~o
n1. with, and even de.tructive ot, ita f1rst obJect.4Z
Scotus makes a compar1son between a .ensory faculty and the intel

42 Ord1nat10, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208, trana. Wolter,

Sootum, 72-73.
-»un. .........................
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lectual taculty.

If being and inflnlte were contradiotory, the

notion ot infin1te being should be as disagreeable to the intellect as a discordant sound. is to the eo-.

But the notion ot In-

f1nite being 1s not d1sagreeable to the intellect.
seems to be the most pertect thing we can know.

Rather, it

'I'herefore, beine

and infinite are not oontradictory_
We have seen many arguments trying to prove tbeooJllpoa.
sibI11ty ot Infinlty and. being,.

Betore these arguments, Sootua

baa already shown that the being with the triple primaoy in .ttlcien01. tinality, and eminence, exists.

Because thls being muat

be the most pertect, it must have all possible perfections whi'oh
would be betitting to its nature.

If lnfinity and being are oom-

patlbl., then the IROst perteot being must ba.... the pertectlon ot
lnfinity.

This is why Sootua bas introduced many arguments tryi

to pro .... the compatib1lity ot Infinlty and b.lng.

POl"

Scotua. th

proots ot oompatibl1ity do not assume that we bave a proper oonoept ot the intinite being, aince he baa defined inflnity in a
negati .... anner:

"The infinite is that which exoeed. tt. tinIte,

not exaotly by reason ot any finite measure, but in exoe88 ot an,.
meaaure that could be assigned. "43

Since Intln1ty is known In a

negative way, and since being i8 a concept abstraoted trom finite
beinga, tne compossibility ot infinity and being would represent

43 OrdinatI0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2J II, 207, tran8. Wolter,

l2!a!. Scotu.,

7~.
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what is possIble, even though the compossibility is not a proper
concept.

!S!

He-doing

~

Anselm's Argument

Immediately after this persuasive argument that the intellect can disoern no contradiction in the notion of an infinite
beins, Scotus continues:

"In this same way Ana elm' s argument in

the Pro,losion about the b1ghest oonceivable good can be tOUChed
up. w44

Our interpretation ot the words, .. i n this 8ame Yay".. is

that Saotus will emphasize that the starting pOlnt ot Anselm',.

al"

gument should be interpreted as the concept ot infinite being 11'1
which the intelleotcan discern no contradiction.

And. since Sco-

tus malntained that the argumenttrom the intellect's delight in
the notion of an intinite being 1s a oonfirmation ot the str1vina

ot the will to possess an infinite good, we can interpret Scotua
to be connecting both of the prIor arguments trom the will and tb
intellect with his re-doing of Anselm's argument.

!h! Possibility

~ ~

Scotus doe. think that that than which nothing greater
can be thought Is the infInite being, sinoe he said
in Book I, distinotion II, questIon 11. 45

80

explicitly

And In the very 1'8-40-

44 Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208-209, trans.
Wolter, ~ Scotu•• 1j.
theals.

45

Or41natl~,

1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 128.

Se. page) ot
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ing ot Anselm's atarting point, Sootus is seen to be substituting
the concept ot infinite being tor Anselm's greatest conceivable
object and to be emphasizing that the concept is without contradictions
Hi. ['l.nsel1ll.'i/ de8cJJiption must be understood in this way_

God is a being conceived without oontradiotion, who 1s so
great that it would be a contradiction it a greateJJ being
could be oonceived. That the phrase ·without oontradictionmust be a4ded is clear, tor an,-thing, the "IeJJY knowledge or
thought ot which include. a contradiction, i. called "inconceivable-, tor it Includes two oonceivable notions 80 oppose
to eac.h other that they cannot in any way be rused into a
lingle conceivable object. aince neither determines the other.
It tollows then, that the greatest object conceivable
without oontradiotion can actually exist in reality. Th1s 1
proved tirst ot its essential being, tar 1n suoh aft object
the intellect 1s tully satist1.~; Ylz. "being", 11 veritied
and thi. in the highest degree.4b
interpret that the last paragraph is arguing that

We

there i. no contradiction in the starting point, the notion ot an
intinite being.

Pol' 1n the greatest conceivable object, we dis-

cover the primary object at the intellect, being, and in 1ts higb
est degree.

We understand Sootus to mean intinite being by tbe

vorda, -being

and

this in the blghest degree," on the basia ot

another passase where he shaWl

U8

the

bette~

.a to give to the concept. "highest being."

meaning that he wish
This passage occurs

arter Scotus has tully proven the existenoe of one infinIte being
in the disouuion of the question whether man i. able to have nat

46 Ordinatio, 1. d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 209-210, trans.
Wolter, Dun. Sc~tu••

'3.

ural knowledge ot God.

Be writesa

But it you say that "higheat good" or "Higheat Being"
expresses an intrinsic mode ot being and includes other ooncepts virtually. I reply that it "higheat" be taken in a
comparative sense, then it 1noludes a relation to 80mething
extrinlic to tn. being, whereas "infinite" is an abaolute
ooncept. But it -highest-il understood in an absolute
.enae, i.e., aa meaning that the ver1 nature of the thing is
such that it oannot be exe~ded, then this pertection ls oon
oelved even more expressly In the notion of an infinite being, beoause "highest good" does not Indioate as such whether it Is infinite or tlnite.41
Thus the better meaning that can be given to the word -highest"
is "infinite," in whioh there is no relation to somethlng extrlns10 to the intinite being.

It "highest" were taken in a compara-

tive sense, then ,we would not know whether the highest be1ng 1s
infinite or tinite.
then the replaolng of

And it' the highest being were only .tinite,

Ana.1m'.

startlng point with the conoept ot'

the highest finite being would not make sense in thia oontext
where the notion ot an intinite being i, being discuased.
The non-oontradiction ot the notion ot infinlte being i

stressed

b,. Sootua.

If infinite and being wepe contradlctor,. to

one another, they would not torm a un1fied concept.

But aa Sootu

argues, the ooncepta do toPa a unttled concept, namelYJ
the concept ot' an infinite he1nl_ For this ls almpler than
the conoept ot "good beIng" or true being" or other s1mIlar
ooncepts, sinoe infinite is not a quasi attribute or property ot "beIng" or of that ot whioh it ls predioated. Rather
it signlfies an intrinsIc mode or that entltY', so that when

47

Duns Scotua,

Ordlnat10, 1, d. ), q. 1-2; III,

21-28.

41,

trans. Wolter,

I aa1 "Infin1te Being", I do not have a ooncept oomposed acoldentall1, aa 1t were, ot a sUbJeot and its attribute.
What I do bave la a concept of what is easential11 one, name
1,. ot a subject wi th III oerta1n grade ot perfection -- int1n1
t1- It la lIke "Intense whltenesa," whIch i8.not a not10n
that i8 aocidentally compo8"d, such as ·visible whitenes."
would be, tor the intenalt1 is an Intr1nsic grade ot whitene •• lt.elt. Thus.the simp110ity of thla oonoept "Infln1te
Being" 119 evldent.46
Although a tormal note i8 added to being when inf1nite la predicated of being, we do not have a conoept composed aooldentall"
a. it were, ot a subJeot and It. attrIbute.

aather we have a

COD

oept whioh Is es.entially one, a subject with a oertain degr•• or
mode ot perfeotion, Infin1t1.
We have seen the proof ot Sootus that the oonoept, In-

1'init. being, does not

tOl"m

a oontra<110t:l.oo and that th.....1'oN

the conoept bas e •• entlal beIne, e •• e gu1ddl!l1tl'{URlt,49

SInce

that proot 1. .lmilar to the proof. trom the intellect and will

to.,. the compatlbll1t, ot infinIte

and

beIng, It appears that Sco-

tua holds his 1"e-dolog 01" Anaelm. s argument to be on11 a persuasIve argument.

POI' ScotU8 noted that the argument trom the in-

tellect '. anal,.s1. of the conoepts, infinite and
a persuasive

p~oot.

bel~.

vas onl1

We should note once agaIn tbat thele

p~oot.

ot co.patibilit,. do not a •• ume th"t ve haw a proper oonoept ot

ot the infinite being.

48 Ordinatio,
Z'I.
49 Wolter bas

Dun! S,9ot'q!,
tial beIng.

1fh8 OCRpatibi11t,. ot Inflnlt,. and be1ns
1, d. j, q. 1-2; III,
tranalated

~

40,

t~n8.

Wolter,

guldditativum aa e •••n-

would represent what is possible even though the oompatibility is
not a proper conoept.
The Aotual,itt .2!:

~

We oan continue the a.nal,.si. ot the argUl'l.lent.

Now that

the esse guidditativwm of the infinite being has been persuasivel,.
shown, it remaina to show that the infinite being must haTe aotual
existenoe,

~!!e

existenti!e:

It 1s further argued, then, that this being aotuall,.
exist. becaus. the highest oonceivable object is not one
which i. merel,. in the intelleot ot the thinker, tor then it
both could exist, because a. something po.sible it i. conoeivable, and yet could not eXist, beoau.. the id.a ot exi.ting in virtue ot some cause is repugnant to ita TefT natUzt ••
This latter was shown above in the seoond oonolusion ot the
proot tram etticienor. Theretore, what exists in reality i.
conoeivably greater than what exist, onlr in the intellect.
This is not to be Wlderstood, howeve.r, in the senae that
.omething oonoeived it it actually exists, is by tact ot
existing, conceivable to any greater extent. The meaning is
that whateTer Mists is greater than wl».tev.r is solely in
the inte11ect.>O
Th. reality of the essence or ess, guidditatl!y! ot infinite being
has already been shown.

It the essence were only in the intellect

ot a person conceiving ita possibility, then the only way that the
essenoe could exi. t, it it did not alpeady exis't at ,it.elt by
nece.sity, would be that the essence were caused to exist.
it is oontradictory to the notion

or

But

infInite being, the greatest

conceivable objeot, that it have the imperfection at being caused.
=

~

~

So OrdinatI0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2f II, 210, trans. Wolter,
Scotua, 7J-1~. lote that Wolter has translated e8s~ existenas actual existence.

Therefore the essence cannot be only in the understand1ng but must
exist or 1taelf in order to preserve the status ot the essence ot
infinite belng as a true possible.
exists in

reali~

isaonoeivabl¥

Scotus notes flnally that what

greate~ ~han

what exists only in

He says that this means n,ot tha y the thing i8 con-

the intelleot.

ce1ved to a greater extent 1f it exists, but that a possible whioh
exists is greater than anything wMoh 1s onl1 in the int elleot.
By this re-doing, Sootus baa persuasively proven the two
points whioh were assumed in the objeotion (whicb al.lll1Marized Ana.1m's

U' guaent)

to be evident twough the. .el vea.

assumed to be evident through the..elves yere.

The two point.

first, that in-

finite and ,being were oompossible, and· seoondly, that the 1ntinite
being must exist.

Infinite and being are compo.sible,. that is"

their notes have a quidditative reality

si~.e

there i. no contra-

dict10n in the concept of infinite be1ng, and ,ince the will and
I

intelleot strive to attain the infin1te good

~

truth.

The in-

finite being must exist, that is, must bave existent1al reality
.1nce it 1s a contradiction to ita essenae to be oaused by anothen
Sootus

otre~.

anotbep pe-doing of Anselm's argument.

Or the argument could be retouOhed in this :'7- Whateyep exists is conceivable to a greater extent .l.than what
does not exl.jJ, that is to say. it oan be known more ~rf'eot.
17. becau.e it 1s intuit1ve17 intelligible or v1sible •. What
doe. not exist e1ther 1n i~.e1t or In something more noble to
whioh it adds nothing, is not capa")le or b.108 intuited. Now
what oan be seen 1s able to be known more perteotly than what
cannot be intuited, but known ~nly ab8t~activel1. Thererore,

28
the most perfect thing that oan be known exists. 51
This argument presupposes tram the previous re-doing that ScotuB
has

~stabllshed

the essential being, the esse gulddltat&vum, ot

the infinite being a8 the most perfect thing that oan be known.

Now in this argument, Scotus analyzes what would necessarily be
predicated ot this essential being.

Now the essentIal being of

infinite being implIes that the best perfeotion of knowability be
But the most perfect way ot

attributed to its essential being.
being known is intuitive knowledge.

Por intuition ls knowledge ot

presence, that 18, knowled88 of exlstenoe.

Therefore, the essen-

tial being of infinite being must have actual existence,
~stentiae.

esse~

Por it the infinite being did not aotually exist, it

would not be able to be intuited;

and

then its non-existenoe would

oontradict ita essential realitJ whioh ought to be able to be intuited.

But we cannot contradict the essential being.

the infinite beIng

!b! ~

DlUI

Therefore,

t exist.

Perfections
We have $een two re-doings ot Anselm's argument tor the

existence ot God.

In the first re-doing, Sootus bas plaoed the

emphasis on showing the compatibility between infinity and beIng.

$1 Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2: II, 210.211, tran.. Wolter, ~I. Sootuf' ?li. See S. Day, O.P.H., Intuiti\te arw=tiO!U A
~ to-tbe-Slgn tlcance gt the Later Scholastlpt, St.onaventure,
T.-Y.;l~, 101-1041 :Jaotus requil"es bOth presence and the existence of the object tor pertect intuit1.. oognition.
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By showing Scotus t • emphasis on the fact that the pure perteotions
are compatible, we will better understand his re-dolnga of the argument of Anselm.

In deflning a pure or .imple perfectlon, Sootus start.
with Anaelm's descriptlon'

"Perfection 1n the unqualified .enae

ot the term 1s one whloh, in anything having It, it 1s better to
have than not to have."52

Elsewhere, Scotus define..

"That 1.

said to be a pure pertection whioh Is better in el'e:rythlna than
that whioh i. not-it. "S3
In two plaoes.

1'h1. definition is qualltied by Sootua

Pirs t, the phrase, "than tna t whlch is not-it," i.

to be understood .. "than aD1thing po.ltlve Which 1. inoompatible
wlth it. "54 Allan Wolter explain.• that, although bwlan natllr'e 18
better than a atone (a non-human nature), stll1 hutnan nature Is a
11ml ted pertec tlon, not a pure perfeotlon, aince human nature la

not better than angell0 nature whlch 1. po.i t1vel;y incompatible
with it.

But Inteillgenoe 1. a pure perteotion ainoe It 18 better

than amy thing poaitlvely inoompatible with it.

Por the Intelli-

gent is alway. better than what i. not intellig~t.SS

$3 Roobe, 12! blmo PrInolp10, 77 •

.$4 ay., 79.
S$

Wolter,

Tbe

trlnaoegd,ntala,

164.

Seoondly,
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a pure pertection is not better in every thing. 56

POI'

example,

intelligenoe in a dog is not better than non-intelligence in a
dog beoause intelligenoe i8 incompatible with the nature ota dQg.
Brietly, a pure

p~rtectlon

may be detined as "that which 1. abso-

lutely and in an unqualified .ense better than everything incompatIble with it.-S7
Allan Wolter notes that Sootus gives speoial attention
to tour properties of the pupe pertectionsl

(1) all pure perteo-

tions are mutually oompatible, (2) all pure perfeotlons are compatible with infinity, ()

pure perteotions are communicable; and

(~) pure pertection. are irreducibly simple. Sa
(1) All pure perteotions are mutually compatible.
ter 8U_81"i&.8 the argument ot Scotuel

Let

US

Wol-

designate by A and

B two pure perteotions whioh are mutua.1ly i:n.col'1Jj')atible.

How sinoe

a pure perteotion i. that whioh i8 simply and absolutel,. better
than anything inoompatible with it, A as a pure perfeotion must be
better than B whioh i. incompatible with A.
B

as a pure perfeotion wl11 be better than

with B.
true.

But 1n like manner,
A

which 1. incompatIble

But suoh mutually oontradiotory propositions oannot be
It they were

t~u..

then any given pure pertectlon could be

both better and not better than another pure perfection.

$6

Roolle, ~ }triao lTlrnciRl0. 79.

$7 ~.

sa

Wolter • .fbI. TPa"'·" ....... dentala .. 166-167.

Since

)1

that contradiotion in the notion ot a pure pertection follows

~om

holding that pure perteotions are inoompatible, we must hold that
every pure pertection mUlt be oompatibltt with every other pUN
pertection.

This consequence preserves the detinition of a pure

pertection. 59
(2) Every pure perteotlon i8 oompatlble with intinity.

Wolter notes that this presupposes two propositlons:
infinity is a positive

~tection

first, that

or mode ot being, wad seoondly.

that nothing exceeds that which i8 intinite.

Now

if a pure per-

teotion were inoompatible wi tb IntlnitJ', it would be bette,.. than
infinity.

POl"

a pure pertection i. better than anythlng inoom-

patible with it.

But 81noe nothing exoee48 the infinite, a pure

perteotion cannot exoeed the infinite and
patible wlth Intlnity.60

tberet~e

mus t be oom-

SootUI here i& able to otter another

definition 01" a pure perfeotion as "that whioh oan exist unlimited in something. "61

Thus Wolter explains that a

pUN

perfeotion

ca.n be desoraibed as that who.e tort1tll notion oontains no impex-tection ox- li~tatlon.62
(3) Every pure perfeotion is oommunioable.

SootU&

&1'-

gues for the oommunioability ot the pUJ:lle perfect.ions wi th J'epra

59

~'4., 167.

60

reid., 167-168.

61

~. ~ ••

62 Wolter,

1, d. 26, q. un.; I, 994.

lba

Tranlcendentallf 168.
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to the Persons in the Divine Nature. b3

However, we can abstract

his argument from its context and de.cribe it briefly.

If the

pure perfections were incommunicable, the defin1tion ot a pure
pertection would be contradicted.

Pol" a pure pertection i8 ·one

which, In an,.thing baving it, it i. better to -have than not to
have. a64 A pure pertectlon has been def1ned as that which oan be
in many, as that wh10h many oan partioipate in.

So a pure perteo-

t10n must be oOJlll'1unioable to many.
(4.) Every pure perteotion is irreducib11 simple.

It a

pure pertection were composed of parts A and S, these parts would
have to be pure pertectiona in order to constitute the original
perfection.

These parts would have to farm an essential unity,

for an aacid.ntal unity could not constitute a pure perteotion.
But the •• parts can make an essential unit,. only by being relatea

as act and potency.

But to be related as aot and potenoJ would be

to make these parts mutuall,. pertectible and consequently impertect.

Bence the.e part. cannot be pure perteotlons.

pure pertectton cannot be composed ot parts.

And hence a

For parts can never

oonstitute a pure pertection. 6S
Scotua' anal,..i. ot the pure pertections bas emph.ai.ed
the characteristic ot cOIlpatlbility.

6.3
64

We can see this empbasla on

Ord,lnatl0, 1, d. 2, P. 2, q. 1-4.; II, 341.
9Mgdl. q. 5; xxv, 216a.

65 Wolter,

~

Transcendental., 169.
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compatibility in the
that:

R!

Primo Erincipio where Scotus establishes

"Every pure perteotion la predicated. of the Highest Nature

as necessa.l"ily existing there in the hIghest degree.· 66

This is

proven by showing that necessary existence in the Highest Natu:re
is COE:eatible w1 th a pur. peJ-feotion.
point ~

Wolter's analysis is to the

a pure perfection ia by definition more perfect than what

ia incompatible with it.

Now It a pure pel"feotion Is incompatible

With thl Supreme Nature, it would have to be .,re perfect than the
m.ost ,ertec t na tare -- whioh is acontradic tion.

Therefore a pur.

pertection must be compatible with the Supreme Nature.

Now a pure

pertection cannot exist contingently in the Supreme Nature but
must exist necessarily.

For a pertection is more perfectly pos-

sessed necessarily than contingently, providing that neoessity ot
inherence is not repuanant to a pure pertection, for it it were,
a pure perfectIon would be exceeded by

somethl~

inoompatible with

it, that ls, by what can neceasarily exist in the Supreme Nature.
Therefore, neces.i ty of being able to exist in the Supreme Nature
is not repugnant to a pure pertectlon. And since it i8 possIble
tor the unoausable '!rat

Natur.~to

posse.s a pure pertection nec-

essarily, theretore it doss poaseas it necessarily.67
In examining Scotua t treatment of the pure perfections,
we have seen him emphasiSing compatibility.

compatibll1ty in the

ra-doing ot Anselm's definition; compatIbIlity in the

67

Wolter,

l!l!.

an"'~ ..:..,

~\S Tovv~

~
~"
LOYOLA
:Iraqsoendentala, 172-173_,
IINI\lI='R~ITY

\.

-'?

\S
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the properties ot the pure perfectIons; and compatIbIlity in show
Ing that the pure pertections

mWl

t exist in the Supreme Nature.

Perhaps now we can see how and whf ScotU8 haa re-done
the ontologIcal

ar~ment

ot Anselm.

ScotU8 believea that In

treating concepts auch as being and Infinity and the pure perrecttons. he Is thinking real ooncept. trom which cons.quenc •• can
be drawn tor this existent world.

In Ohapter II. we sball s ••

that Leibniz also treats concepts as
draw consequences for the

.xlsten~

~.alltie,

world.

trom WhIch he can

OHAPTER II
LEIBNIZ

The purpose ot this chapter is to de.cribe Leibn1z'.
re~do1ng

of the ontological argument; we may begin by noting hi.

reterences to Descat-tes.

Leibniz sWImlat'l£ea Descartes" ontologi-

cal argument tor the existenoe ot God aa follows:
Descarte.' argument for the Existence ot God aasu.ea
that the all-pertect beins,- or the neoessary being, is po.a1
ble.. The argument comes to this: the all-pertect being includes in ita idea among other perteotions tbat of existins
neoessat-ily; or the al1-perteot being is a necessary being_
How the neoessBrY being exists; therefore, the all-pertect
being exists. l
The argument, God is all-perteot and haa then tbe perteotion ot
neoe •• a~ existence, is valid but needs strengthening. Laibnis
writes.
The Geometer., who are the pas t masters ot the art ot
reasoning have realized that in order that proofs based on
detinitions be valid one must show, or at least poatulat.j
that the notion oomprised in any of the definitions uaed 1.
possible. • •• The same preoaution is neoessary in every
type ot reasoning, and ab.ove all in the d••o~atration due to
Anae1m, Archbishop ot Oanterbury (in 1ibro gontra tgaipl!9teg), whioh proves that since God 1. the greateat or _at .
perteot being, He p08sess~. a1ao that perfection termed ex1 Leibn!z, "Reform ot the Ontological Argument'" ~
MonadoloSI !!! Leibniz with Introduction, Oqmmentuf and SgppliiiS
!!£l Ea.aXI, trans. B.~arr, tos Ange1ea, 1930, ~
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istence, and that consequently He exists; an argument which
was subjected to scrutiny by St. Thomas and other Scholastice, and whioh was revived by M. des Oartes. Regarding this
it must be said that the argument is quite valid, providing
that the supremely perfeot being or the being possessing all
perfections is possible. Par here we have the central characteristic ot the divine nature--that its essence contalna
its existence, i.e., that God exists provided only that ne 1,
poaeible. And thus simply omitting all reterence to pertection, one can aal: It the Necessary Being is possible, Be
exists--doubtless the most beautiful and important propoaition ot the doctrine ot modalities, since it turnisbes a passage trom possibility to actuality and it is here and here
alone that A Ro!se!& ess! valet gonse9u.nt~a.2
Since Anselm and Descartes base their arguments for the existence

ot God upon their definitions ot God, Leibnia points out that in
proots based on definitions one must show or at least postulate
that the notion used is .. possible...

Then he. remark. that it it

can be shown that God is possible, it would follow that God exist.
because hi. essence contains his existence.

'rhus Lei bnis will em-

pbasize the establishing of the possibilitJ of God.
Leibnia presenta three ways of establishing the possibilitJ ot God:

a) the postula tins w the presuming ot the possi-

bilityor the most perfect being until impossibility is shown; b)
a proof of the possibility ot the nece.sary tieing Which., moves troll
contingency to necessity; and c) an A

Rrlor~

proof ot the possl-

bili ty of the moat perteot being which (uJtab1i'3hea the oompossi-

2 L$lbnls, Dl. Philosophiachen Sohrlrten 4Gn Gotttrie~
Wl1helm teibnla, IV, e~a.I. Gerhardt, Darmstadt, 1 0, 401-40!J
trans. NIc60Iai Rescher, ·Oontlngence in the Philosophy ot Leihnis,· 'rhe Philosophical Revlex. LXI, 1952, 35. Gerhardt's aditiol
hereafter referred to as ~erhardt.
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bilit, ot the pure perteotion. • .3
.) The tirst way, then, is the presumption ot the posai

bl11tr ot God.

Lelbnis writea.

In my view It ,LDeacartes t 8.l"gumcflli/ 1a a good argument thoug
lmJHlt-teet and what it lacks can be supplied. But even as 1t
atands, imperfect and with nothing added, it baa conaiderabl
value insotar as it proves tha t the d1 vine nature enjoys at
least this priv1lege that it needs .only poasibility at .ssence in order to ex1st. What 18 1IOre, the argument gives
at least presumptively the existenoe of God, fbI' all exi~t
eMe must be thought poaaible in the abaeme ot proot to the
contrary, until that is to aay, we aN made to see that 1t i
impossible. ru. RreaU1llp!Q!'!t as we . r oall 1 t' i. 1ncaomparably higher than a .lmp:e supposition, aince moat aupposi
tiona aust be pPaved betore they oan be adml tted, while what
evep is presumed must pass as true until it 1s refuted. • •
Bow possib11ity is alwa,. pre . . . . and must be beld true UDtil impossibility i. proved. This argument accordinglx bas
the tor.e that it la,.. the caRll! probandi; on him who dentes
it, and ainoe no one oan preve ita lmpo8.ibl1itl we must hal
God'. exi.tenae to be real.~
.

Tllu. Lelbnia would aocept the ontological &l"Sument with tbe additlon that possibilit,. is alwa,.s presumed until impossibility is
shown.

And no one can prove the impossibility

or

God.>

b) Hovever. Lelbniz admits that such a presumption does
not 1"1801'"01181,. demonstl'8. te the existence ot the necessary beinS.

So he otters an absolute dem.onstration ot' tOt poss1bil1t, of' God
as the seoond wa1 ot establishing the possibility at' God.

Leibnl

writ•• , continuing the last text quoted.

)

Jacque • .Talabert, L,! Dlf)J.! de. Leibnlz, Paris. 1962,

4 Lelbnlz, IfRetol'lft
MonadoloSl. 1>S-156.
S

Qt. 1
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or

the Ontological Argument, If

l!!!.

)8

Should we vish howeyer, to make the demonstration absolute
in the manner or geometry we must give the proot of the posaibllit.y which it requires. I .bave tried to contribute such
a proot by making it evident that if the neoessary being
were impossible, all the contingent beings would be impossible also, and so nothins would be possible. For sinoe oontingent beings haYe not in themselves the sufficient reason
of their existence they must have recourse to the necessary
~eing, vh6 iah is the ulti. ratio rerum, the final ground ot
things.
The tinal sentence ot this text seems best interpreted as the
proot ot th. pOSition stated in the same text that it the necesaary being is tapossible, all contingent being would be impossible.

For tbt las t sentence argues that since contingent beings

have not in themsel Yes the sufficient reason ot their existence,
,
they must tind their suftioient reason in tbe neoesaary being.
The word "existence" was underlined in the last sentence to show
that Leibniz has argued that, since oontingent beings

MUS t

tind

the sufficient reason ot their existence in the necessary being,
all contingent beings would be impossible it the necesBarY being
would be impossible.

Thus ve see that Leibnlz's position that

the possibility ot contingent being is dependent on the possibility ot the necessary being bas required trom Leibnia a proot ot
the actual existence ot the neoessary being.

In the position that "it the nece.sary being were

~

possible, all cont1ngent be1ngs would be impossible," Le1bnis baa
expres.ed the major of a oonditional syllogiSM whose conclus1on i
6

Leibniz, "Retorm or the Ontological Argument," tbe

Monado1oSI. 155-1$6.
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to be that thl necessary being is possible.

But nowhere in the

text quoted or in the context does he express the minor ot this
syllogism.

Theretore we interpret that this minor premis. be

supplied to make the conditional syllogism read as tollows:
It the necessary being 1s impossible, all contingent
beings would be impossible.
But, some contingent being is pos.lble.
TheNtore, the necessary being Is posaible.
We have already seen bow Leibnlz establishes the major
premiae.

The minor premise, which lfe have supplled, _,. be known

in either ot two ways, aa Leibnia writes'
Being Is that whose concept lnvolves somethlng posltlve
that ls, something which is able to be conceived by us in a
way that that which,. conceive is posslble and does not Involve a contradiction. W. can know this tact ot posslbilltJ'
It the oonoept 181 perfectl,. clear and does not Involve anything cont'uaed. We can also tind out, It the thins aotuall,.
shall have Insted, that that whioh exl.ts i8 also .Be1118 or
a posslble;'
For Lelbnia, the possibillt,. of cont1ngent being -1 be known
either b1 an anal"sis or the ooncept of the thing

~

b1 discover-

ing that the thing actuall,. exists or has exlsted. 8

7 Lelbniz. "De modo distlnguend1 phaenomena rea11a ab
lmaglnarlls)" Gerhardt, VII. 319.
8 Rescher, in his article, "Contingence in tbe Philosophy ot Lelbniz," The !hl!. aeView, LXI, 3S, translate. a text
tl'Om Gerhardt, Iv,406. aa tollows. "Those who hold that one can
never inter actual existence 801ely trom notlons, ideaa, det1n1tiona, or possi ble essence. • .den,. the p08sibl1l t1 ot the .eo.,saPr Being • • • • But 1t the Necessary Being or Ens ~~ 18 im.
possible, then allot the things which owe thelr exIstence to
others will also be impossible, since the,. mua t ultima tel,. st ••
t'ram the Ens a .e. Thus no existenoe at all will be posslble ••
This reasonr - leads us to another modal roposltion.. • whloh

The first way in which the possibility ot oontingent
being is known by an analysi. ot the concept ot a contingent being makes this argument trom contingency very much like Leibnis'.
argument tor God's existence trom the reality of eternal truths.
For just as it is sutticient to make an analysis ot a ooncept to
show the possibility ot oontingent being, so also It 11 suffloien
tor him to make an analysis ot a oonoept to show the reality ot
eternal truth.

And ju.t as there 1. an Interenoe trom the possl-

bllity ot oontlngent belng to the possibillty ot the neces.ary
belng, so a180 i& there an,int.renoe trom the reallty ot eternal
truths to the Supreme Mlnd whioh 18 God.

Leibniz write.:

A. regards eternal truths, it mu.t be observed that at bottom they are all oonditlonal, and say In ettect: such a
th1ng posited, .uch another thing il. For example, In la1ing evert tigqre which b!! three sIdes Kill al.o have,tbr.,
anile!, do nothlng but suppose that if the~e !s-a-?fgure
wlth three 11des this same figure wlll have three angles ••
The soholastlc. have dlsputed hotly • • • how the propo
sition made about a subject can have a real truth, It thla
subject does not exlst. The tact 11 that the truth il only
condltional. • ••
But it will be further asked, In what 1
joined with the previous one Llrom tr.tno~e two: It the N.cessar
Belng is posslble, then He must exls
completes the d.-onatration. Thil propo.ltion can be tormu ated thus: It" tbe,,;N.o•• sal'7
aeing does not .xist, n.ith!r wll1 anything .1 ••• • Re.cher then
believes that Leibniz Implles a mln~r afflrming the exlstenc. ot
a contingent being, whlch, when Joined to the la.t sentenoe in hi
translation, would lead to a conclusion affirming the existenoe 0
the Necessary Being. But ReSJ!ber haa indirectl,. translated that
last sentence: ·Si l'Estr. Laii7 neoes.aire n'e.t point, 11 n'J
a point d'Eatre filii possible.
It should be ;ranalated thusl
dIt there 18 no Jeeessary Being, there ls no possible being.d
Reseherts interpretation is incorrect.

..

thls oonnectlon Lbetween subject and predlcati7 founded,
slnoe there ls In It some reallty which does not deceive?
The reply will be that It ls the connection of Ideas. But
in answer it will be asked, where would those Ideas be If no
mind existed, and what would then become ot the real foundatlon of this certainty ot eternal truths? This leads us tinall,. to the ultimate ground of truths, namely to that !sereme !!!!! Unlversal !!!:m., which cannot tail to exlst ... whose
understanding Is the region ot eternal truths • • • • ~
Leibni. is certain that hi. mind knows an eternal truth and that
the gN>Und ot thls certainty 11es in the ideas themselves, independentl,. ot the senses. 10 An u1 t1mate ground of the certaint,.

ot eternal truths is required which cannot fall to exist.

This

u1t1mate ground of truths ls the Mind ot God.
Because the argument trom contingenoy starts with an
analysis ot a conoept and concludes to the u1timat. ground

or be-

ing and because the argument trom the certainty ot eternal

tr~th.

starts with an analysis ot a concept and concludes to the ultimate ground ot truth, it appears that they are basically the same
argument.

Thi. interpretation i. confirmed by a text in the Mo·

9Id01081 where LeIbnIz equates pos.ib1es, essenees, and eternal
truths.

He writes:

43.

It is alsQ true that in God i. the source not only ot
existence. but alao ot essenoes, so tar as they are real, or
ot that whloh i. real in the possible. This i. be~aU8e the
understanding ot God i. the region ot eternal truth., or ot

9 Leionia, "New Essays on Human UnderstandIng,· Le1bnia Se1ectionl, ed. P. Wiener, New York, 477. Wiener's edition
hereafter ret erred to as Wiener.
ner

66.

10

.

Leibni., "Hew Bs.ays on Human Understanding;" Wie.

tbe ideas on which they depend, and because, without him,
there would be nothlng real in the p08s1bllitles, and not 0
~1 nothlng exlsting but also nothing possible.
44. For, If there Is a reallty In essences or posslbl11tles
or Indeed in the eternal truths, this reallty must be found ....
ed in something exlsting and actual, and consequently in the
exlstence of the necessary being In whom essenoe involves
existenoe, or wlth whom it is sufflcient to be possible in
order to be aotual. ll
Leibniz has said that the understanding of God is the region of
eternal truths, that is, the region of the Ideas on wblch the
eternal truths depend.
the same

t07!

Leibniz.

And the ideas, essenoes, and po.aibles ar
Thus the proof trom contingenoy and tbe

proof trom eternal truths are basioally the same sinoe they both
start with the reallty involved in the posslbles or essences.
We have seen one interpretatlon of the conneotion at tb
argument from contingency wi tb tbe ontologice.l argument by seelng
bow the minor ot the oondi tional syllogism was evldent by' an anal
ysls ot the ooncept or essence of a contingent thing.

'.fhere

should be another interpretat10n 1t the minor ot the condltional
syllog1s. 1s evident by discovering that some contingent actually
exists.

Then Leibn1z is argu1ng that some contingent being Is

posslble because it 1. actual and that this possibility vt oontin
gent being is dependent upon tbe possibility of the necessar,. being.

But the question should be asked:

bow does he know that

this being which exists i. contlngent?
To answer that questlon we must Investigate Leibni.-,

-

11

Leibniz, MMonado10gYi

Q

Wiener,

S41.

4.3
notion ot truth.

His idea ot a true proposition is -such that

predicate, necessary or contIngent, past, present, or tuture.
Is included In the idea of the subJeot. u12 The predioate is con~very

tained in the subjeot of a true proposition in one of two ways.
For Leibniz holds that there are two kinds ot truths:
those ot reasoning and those of tact. Truths ot reasoning
are necessary and their opposite-r;-impossible, and those
ot tact are oontingent and their opposite is possible. l ,)
In truths ot reasoning, the predioate is expressly oontained in tru
notIon ot its sUbJect,14 and the opposite ot the truth is impos.ible sinc. the opposIte would express a contradiotion.

But in

truths of fact, the predicate is only implicitly contained in the
notion ot its 8ubJ~ct,l5 and th~ opposite of the truth is possible
since the opposite would not express a contradiction.
Now we are able to understand why Leibniz holds that
there are contingent beings.
tree choice Is oontingent.

It is the same reason why a man's
As Leibniz writes, a tree choice 1.

ncontingent, beoause neither I nor any other

m~nd

more enlightened

than I, could demonstrate that the opposite ot this truth impli••

Wiener, 97.

12

Leibnlz, "Letter to Hessen-Rheintels, May, 1686; •

13

Leibniz, IfMonado1ogy, 33; If Wiener, 539.

14

Leibnl&, Unti tIed E.say; Gerhardt, VII, 199.

15

-

Ibid.

44a contrad1ct1on. n16

Thus Leibn1z holds that a tree cno1ce 18 con-

tingent and that a being is contingent because he cannot demonstrate that the opposite ot the tree choice or of the being 1mplie.
a contradictlon.
selt that

Por Leibnlz wrltes ot the proposition about hi....

! exist:

i8 a proposition of fact. founded upon an immediate experience, and it 1. not a necessarr proposition whos. necessity
is seen in the 1mmediate agreement ot 1deaa. On the contrary,
there 1s no one but God who 8ee8 how these two terms 1 and
existeno! are conneoted. that is, why I ex1st. 17
Only God can make the infinite analysia lS required to examine all
the possibles and tbeir relationshlps . in order to know why the
essence of Lelbnla would oontribute to the best possible world19
and therefore would exlst.

We have uncovered the reason why Le1b-

niz holds that a being 1s cont1ngent.

His reason ls that there 1.

no immediate agreement of the ideas 1 and .sstenoe and thus there
is no contradiotion 1n sa71ns

469.

99.
347-348.

"l d~ Dot tx18t.lt20

16 Le1bniz,

"an

17 Leibniz,

a_ew 88saY8

Necessity and Oontlngenoy," Wiener, 481.
on Human !novledatl" Wiener,

18 Le1bnlz, "Speoimen calouli univers&lis," WIener, 98.
19 Leibniz. "On the Ultimate O%'1gin ot TbinpJ" Viener,
Of. lnb-~, .54-.5.5.

-

20 Although it i8 necesaary that the e8sence ot Leibniz
exi8t, this neoesaity of existence doea not destroy the contiDae~
cy ot his existenoe. Leibnia wri test "And God bas chosen allOns
an infinIte number ot pos.ibles what he has Judged most tit • • • •
Thi. i. the neceasity, wbiob oan now be aaor:t.bed to things in tbe

In examining LeIbniz t s oonditional

.yl1ogi~

proving

the possibilIty of God trom contingenoy, we have seen two ways ot
eatablishing the minor premise. ·Some contingent being is pos.ible.·

One way was by the analysis ot the concept ot a contingent

being.

The other way wM by judging that .ome oontingent being

actually exists.
c)

~ina+ly,

possibility ot God.

Lelbniz otters an

~

priori proot ot the

Sefore we desoribe this A priori proof, how-

ever, we should .e. what Leibniz •• ys about knowing the possibility of • thing A

2r~ori.

He

w~it.sl

The possibilltX ot a thing, however, is known either ~ jri
the tormer, vum 'lie ana11s. the i ••
Into its elements, that is, into other ideas whose possibili t1 1a known, and know tha t i t oontains nothlna whioh is incompatible. Por example, thi. is the case when we perceive
the manner in whioh an objeot is produced, whenoe cays"
detinitions are of suoh paramount significanoe. On the other hand, we reoogni •• the S ~teriorl possibility ot a
thing when its aotuality 1s ~wn to us through experienoe.
Por whatever exists or bas eli-ted must. in any oa •• b. possl~
ble. In any oa•• ot adequate knowledge we ha.e at the same
ttme an ~ priori knowledge
the pos.ibility} to wit, it w.
have oarried the analysiS through to the end and no oontradiotion i. visible, the po •• ibill t7 ot the idea i. demonstra ..
ted. But whether human knowledge vill ever attain to a per.teet analy.l. ot 1dea., hence to «.1"8' Resaib111tl an4 to
unanalrsable conoepts--in othe,r words. v etaer It ,,111l)•

.2l! or A posteriori:

or

.
.tuture, whioh is called hYRothe~1cal or oonsequential neo..s1t7
(that is to aaYt founded upon t • oonsequenoe ot the hypothesi. ot
the ohoioe made J, which does not d.s troy the oontingenoy ot thinss,
and does n.~t produoe that absolute neoess1ty whioh contina_no., cSoew
not allow.- (Leibn1s, ·On Beee.sity and OontingenoT;" WieneF. 480481). tho•• truths and things are absolutely Ileoe.sary whos. opposit.s imply a oontradiction. Thos. truths and things are Gontingent who.e opposite. do not imply a oontradiction in terma.
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able to ~educe all thoughts to the absolute att~ibute. ot Go
h1mselt, --to ri~st causes and the tinal reason of things
that i8 a guestion whioh I do not due to corusider- 01' deoide
just now. 21
Leibniz would know the possibility ot a thing

~ 2rIor~

by

r.aolvi~

the conoept of the thing into its oomponent parts which must be
known to be, first, possible in
ble with each other.

them.~lves,

and seoondly, compatI-

This analysis into the component. of a con-

cept is called adequate

knowled~

when it 18 perfeotly done.

In

this ad.equate knowledge, the knoWer recognIzes the object present,
disoerns the speoifio notes ot the object, and make. an analysiS

oomplete to the end of the oomponent8 ot the objeot. 22 LeIbnIz
does not know it man is able to have suoh

ad~quate

knowledge but

saya that the beat example whioh approaches very oloaely to adequate knowledge 1. our knowledge ot numbera. 23
to note that Le1bniz doubts whether

sdequat~

It i. signifioant

knowledge is availa-

ble to man, and it i. a180 sign1fioant to note that Leibniz has
said in the last text that he does not now dare to

whetb

~etermin6

er or not man can make a perfect analysis which would finally
reaoh the first possibles and irresolubile notions, the very abaolute attributes of God.

The.e two doubts are signIficant because

they would a.e. to weaken the oertainty ot any demonstration

21 Leibniz l "Refleotions on
Ideas., It Wiener, 287-28tl.
22
2.3

-Ibid ••

28)-285.

Ibid •• 285.

Knowled~,

Truth and

~

Rri.
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~

ot the possibility ot any thing, .specially of God.
However, Leiona does not hesltate to present an .! eri-

2£!

demonstration ot the possibility ot God.

he uses tor

~.tabll.hlng

The criterion that

the possibility ot anything ls twotold:

flrst, the ooncept ls r.solved Into 1ts oomponent parts whloh must
be known to be possible in tbe.s.lves, and s.oondly, the oomponent
parts must be oompatlble wlth one another, tbat ls, non-oontradiotory with one another.

Lelbnlz tultills thls twofold orlterion by

showing th... two thlngs: tlrst, that there exist quallties sus.eptible ot perteotlon in the highest degree; and .eoondly, tbat all
these perfeotlons aXle compatlb1e.
HeXle are examples whioh illustrate tbat there are pertectlons susceptible ot inflnlty. as Lelbniz wrltess
W. must also know what pertection ls. One thins that
can surely be affirmed about it ls th~t tho.e tora or ~~
tures which are not susceptible ot It to the bighest degree,
say the nature ot numbers or ot t1gur•• , 40 DOt perm1 t ot
pertection. Thls 11 becaule the number whlch 1. tbe greatest
ot all (that ls, the sum ot all the nuabers), and 11kewlse
"\he greatest ot all figures, lmply oontr&d,"otiona. The sre..t"
est kno1fl~. howeyer, and omnlpotenoe oontain no Imposslbility.24The contradictlon In the sum ot all the numbers ls tbat tbe whole
would equal the part ainoe th~ sum ot !l! numbers would Include
Its.1t. 2$ Elsewhere Leibnlz explains what the oontradiction ls in

291.

~

LeIbnlz, "Discourse on Metaphyslcl;· Wlener, 290-

2$ telbnia, "Letter to a.moull11, 1698;n WIener, 99.
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the notion of the tastest motlon.

Be assumes that a whe.l is turn-

ing with the tastest motion: then he points out thi. contradiotionl
it one ot the wh.el'. spokes Is extended beyond the rlm, the
spoke-. end poInt would be moving taster than a nail lylng on the
rim, whose lIIotlon ls theretore not the tast •• t. 2.6

In oontrast to

contradictions round in the notions of the taste.t motion and the
greatest number, Lelbnis holds that

th.~e

are no contradlctions in

the notions of the great.st knowledge and of amnlpotenoe.

Because

be can dlscover no contradiction In tho.e ConCeptI, he holds tbat
they are posslble, that they

~taln

no impo.slbility.

In a short paper. -Quod Efta

P.~t.otl.s~

existit,·

He wrlt ••

Leibnis tells us exaotly what he means by • pertection.

I call a pertection every aimple quality whlch ls positive and absolute, or which expresses whatever It express.s
without any limits.
aecauae a quality ot this kind is at.ple, 1t is theretore irresolubl1e or Indetl~bl.. Por otherwis., eIther the
simple quallty would not be one but an aggregate or many, or
1t 1t were one, It would 1)e clrowucrlbed by lUdts, and
thus 1t would b. 'understood by the negatlon ot something ult.rlo~.
but that ls agalnat the hypothesls whioh a.sumes
that; the quallty 11 purely pOlltlve.27
A perteotion 18 a Simple quallty whioh 18 posltlve and absolute.

·Simple- means that the quallty ls not made ot parts.

"Posltive"

means that the quality expresses a reallty whloh ls not understood

Ideal."

26 Lelbniz t -Retleotionl on Knowledge, Truth.
Wiener, 286-2~7.

~

27 Lelbnia, "Quod Bns Perteotl.slmum exlstitj· Gerhardt, VII, 261.
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by any negation.

And since the quality is not understood by any

negation, the quality expres.es a reality which is, a. conceived,
without limita, that is, the quality is

absolute. 8

M

The other require.ent that the qualities should be campatible with one another is fultilled by hi. universal oharaoteristio.

ae writes.
But tor the pre.ent it i. sutficient tor me to remark that
that which i. the toundation ot my oharaoteristio is the saUN
as the demonstration ot the existence ot God. Por the aimplt
thoughts are the elements ot the oharacter1stic, and the s1mple forma are the source ot thing.. So I suppose that the
aimpl~ torms are compatible among themselves.
That is a
proposition whioh I would not be able to demonstrate very
well without explaining at length the tundamentals ot the
characteristic. But it that proposition ia granted, it to1low. that the nature or God, wh1ch ena1ose. all the simple
torms absolutely taken, i. po.sible.2~

Leibnlz holds that his thoughts are a

t~e

representation of reali.

ty and that God is really possible it the simple torma or thought.
are compatible.

That the simple forms, that ia, the pertections,

are compatible ls shown in hi. short paper, -Quod Ens Pertecti.si·
mum exl.tit.-

Prom the detinitlon of perfection as a simple qual-

ity he argues that all the

p~rtectlon.

are compatible.

He write ••

Prom thls Ldetlnition ot perteotloB7 it 1. not dltticul1
to show that all the pertections are oompatible among themselve., that i8, that the,. can exist in the same sUbjeot.
Por let there be a proposition ot this kind.

!

~ ~

are Incompatible

(understanding through A and B two slmple forma or perteotlons, and it 1s the same it many simple forma are taken at

28 Lelbniz, Unt1tled letter; Gerhardt, IV, 296.

the same time) it is olear that that proposition is not able
to be damonstrated ~ithout a resolution at te~s A and S,
either at one ot the two or ot both. Por otherwise tbe nature ot those things would not enter into a reasoning proce••
and incompatibility would be able to be demonstrated .quall,.
about any other things and about themselves. But (by hypoth.81.) they are irre.oluble. Theretore this proposition .boui
them cannot be demonstrated.
But this proposit1on would be able to be demonstrated
about them it the proposJJtion were true, beoause it 1. not
true through It.elt and because all propositiona n.c••••rily
true are either demonstrable or known through th.aselves.
Theretore this propos1tion is not nece.sArily tru.. Or in
other words ~h. proposition rejected i!/. it 1s not neoeaaary that A and Bare 1n the same subject~ 'lOr aga1B7 there tore
A and B cannot be in the same subjeot. 'her.tore, 8ince the
reasoning about any ot these qualit1es 1s the aame, all tbe
perfections are oompatible.
Theretore there is given or there can be understood.
subject ot all pertections, the most perfect be1ng.29
We can best su:mmar1ze the .import ot this text by these tour point.
First, A and B

refe~

to any simple pertectlon. of whlch we can hay.

proper ideas suoh as the greatest

knowled~

and omnipotence.

Bow

God 1. derined as the subject ot all slmple perteotions, the most

pertect being.

Although this concept doe. not exhaust or adequate.

ly derine God, still the

cono~pt

will represent

God, if the a1Jnple pertections are oompatible.
that all the simple

?e~.ctions

th~

possibility ot

Secondly, to

p~ve

are compatible ls impossible,

sinoe the number ot such is lnflnite and we would never be able to
compare them all.

Thirdly, therefore Leibniz proves that indirect-

ly by showing that it ls not necessary that A and Bare incompati.
ble--where A and B reter to any simple perfectlons.

29

Leibn1z~

hardt, VII, 261-262.

It it is not

dQuod Ens Pe~teotis.1mum exiatit;" Ger-

Sl
neoessary that A and Bare inoompatib1e, it Is at least poasible,
i.e. non-contradiotory, that they are not inoompatlbleand so are
compatIble.

Pourthly, to show that It is not necessary that A and

B are incompatIble, Leibniz considers the proposition that it Is
neoessary that A and B are Incompatible.

It this proposItion Is

neoessarily true, it must be either

selt-evld~nt

or demonstrable by finding a mIddle

te~.

from the terma

But the proposItion 1.

not selt-evident alnoe Leibni. oannot disoover any Inoompat1bil1ty
1n the conoepts ot A and B.
to be demonstrated.
and no middle term

And neither is the propos1tlon able

For A and B are simple and lrre.olubile terma
o~ld

be found agreeing with A and B, since A

must Petain its distinotion from the

midd1~

term and trom B.

A

demonstration would require the imposs1ble, that Is, findIng a
middle term 1n tne conoepts or A and 8, that 1s, tlnd1na a complex

1ty in two Simple concepts.

Since thIs proposItion. it Is necea-

sary that A and B are incompatIble, 1s noither selt-evident nor
demonstrable, the proposition :nust be talafh

Therefore this 1.

true that 1t Is not necessary that A and B are incompatible.
Theretore it,is possible that A and Bare oompatible.

Since A and

B reter to any simple perfeotlons, it 1s possIble that all

pert."tionl a.re compatible.

Ther&rozoo,

Le1bni~

~1mple

oan understand the

ide. ot a being possessing all sImple perteotiona.
Leibn1a hal fulfilled
stratIng the pos.ibll1ty ot God

th~

~

two requirements tor demon-

Rriori.

The first requ1rement

waa that there be qualities possible of perfeotion in the highest

degre..
patible.

(the

.econd requirement waa that theae qualities be

001ll-

Althougb tbe oompatibllity of tbe.e slmple perfections

doe. not exhauat tbe reality ot God, stlll the compatibll1t, ot
the.e pertectlona doe.repre.ent the po.slbility ot God.
nis doe. bave adequate 1de•• ot

~ea.

pertections.

POI' Lelb~

Thes. adequate

Ideas are objeotl.e concepta and represent what 18 posslble.
Uter thi • .!et1ori J)!'Oot. Leibnla tell. ua w117 be haa
oonstructed it.
God.

The turninS point ot the arausent ls

t~e

Ide. ot

De •••rtes only appeals to tbe experlenoe ot the Idea in bl.

mind} he doe. not tell other. how to bav. the .... experienoe.
telonia, by this A 21'101"1 proot, has Instructe. other. how to bave
the experience ot the ldea ot God. 30
Pro. the Po •• lbllit!!!.£

~

.i.2 !!!. Actual !lsi.HUe

In the .! -erio£1 proal'. there i. a m.oVement .from. God'.

po •• ibili ty to Hi. aotual exi.tence.

Leibn1. wri tea tihat existen••

1. a pertection and henoe that the being posse •• lng all pGrteotiom
~t

.

exIst:

"Whenoe It 1. olear that this beins exists, since ex-

istenoe is contained in the number ot perteotions.d)l
Although be has mere11 ••••rt.d. here th.t exi.tenoe 1•
• perteotion, hi. tr.. ~ent ot the movement tram the po •• ibility
to the aotuality ot the a08t pertect being i. not lightly done.

)0

Ibi4., 262.

31

Ib&4.

Fo~

1n one re.do1ng ot the ontological argument, he remarks that

perfections see. to b. certain qualitle. and that exlat.nc. ls not

BoveY.p, hi. b.alc crlte~ion tor jUdging

like th.a. qua11tl.a. 32
whether

o~

not .xistence i" a perteotion 1, that existenoe must In-

ore•• e the reality ot' th.e thing oonoeiYed.

w.

ae'e thia orlterion

used when Lelbnil reaol.ea hia doubt and de01de. that existence i.
a perteotlons

"It 1. a1ao olear that Existence 18 a pertection,

or In other words, that it inoreases

ot reall ty Is ooncei .,ed
a posalble

A

~eallty,

that is, that more

when an exi. tent A 1. oonoel Ted than when

1s oonoelyed. A33

Thus Lelbnia holds that .xi.tenoe

1. a realIty, that realIty ls a positlv. predIcate, and that a
thing conoeived •• eXisting baa mope :reallty than the SUle thing
oonc.ived aspo.slble.~

Theretore, sinoe exi.teno. is a perteo-

tion, the moa t perfect belng must

ha,ye

the pert.ctlon ot actually

exlsting.

It would be helpful to our understandIng or

~elbnll

to

Indicat. how ba.lc h. regard. hi. teachIng that all possIble. or
••••no •• tend. toward• •xisteno..

Prom the aotual .xlstence ot con.

tingent being_, Lelbn1a di.cerna' that •••enoes tend toward8 exiat-

32 Lelbnll, "Oolloquium cum Dna. Eooardo ProteaaoN
Hlntelensl Oarte.lano, praesente Dr.I4. Abbatl. Molan! hat ...... "1617 6
Ge~hardt,

266.

I. 214.

33 Lelbnlz, "L.ibnlz an Bokhard, 1671;" Gerhard', I,

34 Lelbn1z, "Marginal not •• of Lelbnla 1n a letter trOJ
EOkhard to Lelbnla, 1677," Gerhardt; I, 226-227.
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enoe.

H. wrltes, that I
w. ought tir.t to r.oognize that trom the .".ry taot that
somethins exists rath.r ttoan mthlns. there i. In po.sible
thing., that 1., in the very po.sibility or •••• ne. a ceptaln exigent need ot existence, and .0 to apeak, aoae clat.
to existenoe; 1n a word, that ••••no. tend. ot It.elt towarda
8xlateno •• 35
'

This proposition that eve1!'1 po.sible tend. to ex.ist i. held by
Leibn1z to be an absolutely tlrat trutn ot tact trom whloh all
tacta can be d.monstrated.)6

In a footnote to his proot ot tbat

tlrat truth of tact, Leibn1z :remark. that exiatence 1. the .".Py
exlgen01 ot inclination ot the e •• enoe to 8x18t. 37 Benoe we s ••
that Lelbn! z emphasiz ••••••no. or po •• ibll1ty

.0

much ibat he

regards .xi.tence .s a consaQ.q..no. ot •••• no ••
Thi • •m)hasia ot ••••no. a. tbe prinolpl. ot existence

can be .een in Leibnia's demonstration ot the exi.tence ot the
best possible 'World.

Arguins tJsom the po.ition tbat ••• enoe tena

ot It.elf towards exi.tence, Lelbni. writes:
Wheno. it turth.r tollows that all po. 51 bl. thing., vb.thap
expre.sing ••••nc. or posslble rea11ty, tend by equal riCht
toward exiatenoe, acoording to their quantity ot a.se~e or
reality, or acoording to the degree ot pertection which tbeJ
oontaln, tor pertectlon i. nothing al •• than quantlty ot
a.seno ••
Hence l' 1. 1Il0st ole&J-ly und.r.tood that amoq thl Infinlt. oombinatlon. ot po.sibl •• and possible .eri•• , that

.3.$ Lelbnls, "Dl.cours.• on Metaphyslc.," Wlen.r, 341.
36 Lelbnlz, Ro. Verltatlbu. Primi.," Op.ra Phl1osophica
Omnla, ad. J.B. ErtdmaM, Mel •• nhe1m, 19.$9, 99.

31

Ibld.

ss
one aotually exists by wh1eh the most of essenoe or ot po•• 1
b11ity is brought into eXi,tence. And indeed there is always in things a principle otdetermina tion which is based
on oonsideration of maximum and minimum. suoh that the great
.st etrect is obta1ned with the least, so to speak, expenditure. • •• So it being once posited that being i. better
than not being. or that there i8 a reason why something rat
81" than nothing should be, or that we must pas. trom the
pos8ible to the aotual, 1t, tollow that even it nothillg tuPther i. determined~8the quantity at existence must be aa
gr_ t as po.sible."
Sino. all possibles tend by equal right toward existenoe aocording
,to the_quantity at essence, that combination ot pOI.ibles (1 ••••
the best possible world) must exist by which the MOst ot essenoa
is brought into existence.
Such an argument may also be applied to God tor Laib01 •• 39

POl" he write. that "Since nothing can hinder the po.a1bil-

ity ot that which possesses no limitations, no negation, and consequently, no contradiotion, this alone is suffioient to e.tabliah
the exi.t.nce ot God .! priori."4.0 Since the divine essence baa no
limitation. that is, since the divine essenoe contains the gpe.test quantity ot essence, the divine .ssence must exist.
does apeak of the most

348.

p~rt.ct

Leibniz

be1ng as "the one that contalna the

38 Lelbn1z, "Diacourse on Metaphysics;" Wiener, 347-

)9 ~h1a 1. the insight ot Wl11iam May, "The God ot
Lelbn1s," The Be. Scholaaticll., XXVI, Ootober, 1962, S16.
4.0

teibnla, "Monadol08Y, 4.>;" Wiener, >41-542.

$6
moat ot essence. M41
We can now
bll1ty of God when he

unde~st.nd

rema~k8

Lelbnlz*n emphasls upon the po•• t

that God 1s

ft

a pure conaequence ot

possible beIng,M42 tor Lelbni. regards existenoe as a consequence

ot essence.

LeibnIs has treated concepts aa objective, as repre-

sentative ot the possIbIlity ot an essence which may exist.
conoept ot God 18 a

real~tz

His

trom whioh he discovers that God ,x-

lata.

41 LeIbnlz. Untitled fragment; WIener, 93.
42 Lelbnlz, "Honadology. 40,· WIener, 540-541.

OHAPTER III

OOMPARISON AID lW.lLUATIOlf OF
aOOTUS AND LEIBBIZ
In thia ahapter ve ahall oompa:re and evaluate the redoings or the ontological argument by Sootua and Leibniz under two
main headings,

(1) proying the pos.ibility

or

God, and (2) movins

f'rom the peasibili t1 of'God to Hi. aotual exiatenoe.

Jll

Proving

t~e

Poasibillty gl

004

Both Sootua aDd Leibnla emphasize proving the aoapoaalbl1ity of the terma Involved in the concept of' GOd, t,;,r example,
the terma "1ntinity" an4

H

being", and "bell1&" and the "simple per-

teetlons", and "necesslty" and "belng".
albl11 t1 of' the tera in .1allar ways:

Hov both mow the composa) ei ther bJ' • conceptual

anal,.ais ot the oonoept ot God, or b) b1 reterring to contingent
being.
a) the tirat way In whlch they try to establish the possibl1ity ot God i8 tbat tbt1 find that a conoeptual analysia can
discern no contradiction in tbe oonoept ot God.
Tbe view ot Scotu. ls tbat tbere 18 no contradlotion 1n
the ooncept ot the great.st conceivable object because in it ls

$7

S8
4iIl00".red th. prillAry object 01' the lntellect, i •••• Int'inlt1._
The terma, ''In.f'lnl ty· and "being", ar& eompo as Ib-J..6 •

bllity oannot be shown
could

~ind

~

Erlorl lIince no analy&is ot concepts

a neoesllaryouDnectlon

b.twe~n

Rather th111 composllibll1ty ill shown
Ill. ot the concept ot
tion.

This compo•• l.

intinit~

by

infinIty and being.

dll1covering that the analy-

being doe. not show any contradic-

Seotus giv•• the tollowing argument as a

J!.rsuasI~

reallon

tor holdlDg the eompossibility ot infinity and bf!d.ng,
Ju.t as .veryth1ng 1s allsumed to be pos.lble, it ita impos.ibility i. not apparent, so also all thinss are assumed to be
compo.sible, 11' their non-oomposaibi11t,. is not manitest.
Now there 1. no non-oompollsibl1ity apparent bere, tor it 1.
not 01' the na ture 01' being to be tinite; nor do.s tlnit. appear to be an attribute coextensIve witb being. But 11' they
were mutual11 l*epugnaftt. it would be tor one ot these r •• soft••
The ooextenslve attribute. which being pOIIseslI.a see. to be
autrloientl, eVident. l
Although Scotu. mak.s the assumption that compossibility ill to be
p~lIumed

unlella non-compossibl11ty is evident, he belleve. that tiM

assumptlon Is not unreasonable and so oalla the proot a persuaslon..
Scotus notes that there

a~

two case. which would ahow non-compoa.

8ibilitJ' between Infinity and being.

The tlrat c••• is that tbe

nature 01' belng mlght always bave to be conceived aa flnite.

tus reJeots this alternative b,. hi. unl"ooal notlon ot belng.

Ieo-

uni-

voclt,. ot belng ls an abstraction whloh ,resolnds trom the varloua
mode. 01 b.ing.

Just

AS

man may abstraot

the

ooncept ot beine

trom the senelble aocldents and b,. this concept have a ooncept ot

l

Q:rd1n&tl0, 1. d. 2, q.• 1-21 II, 201.
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subs tanc ••s being, so man _y abstraact the concept at being trom
tinite being and thus have a concept ot being whioh mal be applioable to an intinite being.

The second case which would show non-

oomposaibllit1 ot infinity and being would
attribute coextensive with being.
sive with being are:

ODe,

be

that tinite 1. an

But the only attribute. coexten-

true, and good, whereas the attribute

tinite-intin1te i8 a disjunctive attribute ot being.

Scotus hold.

that in tbe disjunctive attl"1bute. we may conolud.... a universal
rule that the more pertect extreme exi.t. it the l •• s pert.ct extre.e ot the disjunction exists.

Allan Wolter baa pointed out

that Sootua' analysis ot the tmplicationa ot an ••••ntial order
.how. that wber. an e.sential ord.r exista, one member must tollow
in our knowledge ~om the other member ot the disJunction. 2 Sinoe
Scotu. has rej.cted tbe two ca.e. which would sbow non-compo.sibility between infinity and beins,

be

assume. that the intinite being

i. poa.ible.
Similarly to Scotu., Leibni& tries to e.tablish that God
is possible because tbe intellect can discern no contradiction in
the notion

ot the supremely pertect being.

One reason that Leibnil

otters is exaotly the aame as one ot Scotu.s t reaaona.

For Leibniz

holds that all existence must be 2resumed po.aible until its impos.
sibility is shown.

The reason why no one oan show the impossibil-

ity ot God 1s shown in the
2 Wolter, The

~

priori proof ot tbe possibility ot tb.

Tran~2endental..

159-161.
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1110st perrect being.

A. 3cotua do •• , Leibniz make. a conceptual

analysis or the terms involved in the conoept ot God.

We can sum-

marise the anal,.i. or Leibnis which e.tablishe •. th. possibility
ot God. !. eriori.

The criterion which Leibnis uses 141 tvo.told.1

tirst, the cono.pt i. r •• ol ....d intO' it. component part. which

lIlU4It

be known to be po.sible, and secondly, the component part. must be
cOJIlpatibl. or compo •• ible.
showing the follovingl

Be tultill. that twotold cri tar ion by

tirst, that there existqualitie. po•• ibl.

ot pertection in the bigh•• t degre., aDd ,eoondly, that all the.e
perteotion. are compatible.

A. to tbe .tirst requirement, Leibnia

notes that lithe grea t.st knowledge a or the "all-mishty'* do not imply a contradiction, whereas the oono.pt ot the gr.at.st number
doe. imply a contx-adiction.

Pw the .um ot all numbex-. would have

to be the sua ot it.elt and all tbe otbex- nuaber..

But .uch a CoD

cept as pertec t knowledge 1s pos.ib1e aince it haa no contradiotion.

Bow using a definition of pertedtion as a slmple quallty

which is purely positive and ab.olute, that is, Without limit.,
Leibniz trie. to p!'Ove that all the simple pertections are oompatible.

To do so, be oonsiders a pPOp08itioD that it is neo ••• ari11·

true that A and B 8.1'Ie incompatible--where A and B refer to any
aimple pertect.ion. ot whioh we have proper knowledge or Oan have
.uch.

Lelbrda make. t.his indirect app!'oaoh beoauae it i. impo•• i-

ble

proye that all .taple perteotions are compatible, since the

~o

number ot .uch is in£inite and we would never be able to oompaN
th.. all.

So, Leibnis oon.iders the con.equence. ot the nece.aar-
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i17 true proposition that A and Bare inoompatible.

It the propo-

sition is necessarily true, it must be elther self-evident fro.. tnt
ter_ or demons trable by finding a middle term.

But tho proposi-

tion 1s not se1r-evident since Lelbniz cannot intuit any Inoompatlbl1it1 in the concepta ot A and B.
able to be demonstrated.

And nelther 18 the proposltloJ

POl" A and B are slmp1e terms whioh oan-

not be resolved Into parts. tbus no middle term could be found agreeing witb A and S, since A and B MUst retain a distinction trom
any middle tera.

Since the proposition that it is neceaaarily

t:rue that A and Bare ino01!lpatib1e i. neither se1t-evldent nor
demonstrable, the proposition must be tal.e.

Theretore this 1.

true that it i8 not nec •• saP7 thf"t A and B are 1ncompatib1e.
Theretore it 1s possible that A and It aN oompatib1e.

Slnce A and

B reter to any stmple perteot10ns, it is po.aible that all simple
perteotlons are oompatib1e.

Theretore, Leibniz Gan understand the

ide. 01' a being po.sesslng all aimp1e perfections as a possible.
Although the oompatibi1ity ot these simple pertections is not a
pr9per conoept ot the essenoe ot' God, still the.e p«pteotiona represent the poaslbll1'y ot God.
these pert'ectloDa.

POl" Lelbnl. does have some idea ot

And he be1iev.s that the.e ideas

aN

objeotlve

concepta, that Is, representa'ive 01' what ls possible.
Sinoe we have seen Leibni. make an argument t'or the

POI-

siblli'7 ot God t'1"o. the compatibility ot simple perf.otions, we
ma1 examine Scotua' treatment ot' the same perteotions.
ni.tJ..cant Wle ot' the pure perteotions 1. in the

!!

The liS-

l?lmo Princi»10
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vhe.re we have seen Scotua argue that eYIU.'"" pure perfectIon must
exist In' the high•• t

nil ture..

Scotul proyei that by showing that

neee,ssar,. exiatenoe in the highest nature i. oompatible wlth a

In that proof, 8eotua 1. argulng from a detini-

pure perteetlon.

tion ot a pure perteetlon conoeived trom this world.

A pure pep-

teotian ls that which 1.. simpl,. and aOlolutel,. bette!' than anything 1ncompa1;lble with it.

Somehow Scotu. derivel the defin1tlon

from thi s world.

Perhaps we can

C011l

truot a re-do1ng ot Anselm's argument

whioh would be in accord with Scotas t treatm,nt ot the propertl••

ot a pure pertectton.
all pure

The tour aign!.t'lcant propertles are.

p.!'tectlOhsAr~

(1)

mutually compatible; (2) all pure pert•••

tlons are compat1ble wi tb In!'ln1t1J (3) pure pertections are oommunicable; aDd (4) pure" perteotions are irreduclbly aimple.

Lelb-

niz bal based one ot hi. proofs ot the posslbi11 ty ot God. on tbe

simpliclty ot pure

p~rteotlon'.

However, a Scotiatl0 proot ot 00.

patlbllity ot the pure p.rteotiona would be baaed on the first two
propert1es.

Pirat, we would show that all pure perfeotion. ax-e

mutually Incompatible.

How 11nee a pure pertection i8 tbat whioh

i. 8imp11 and absolute11 better than anything
1t. A a8 a pure perfeotion must

patlble with A.

~e

incomPQti~le

with

better than B whioh 1. ineo...

But in 11ke mamer. B as a pure pertection will

be better tban A whioh i. incompatible with B.

It such

mut~117

contradictory propositions were true, then any given pure pex-teotion 'WOuld be both bett.x- and not better than another pux-a perte..

6.3
tlon.

Since that contradiotion tollowa tl'Om holding that pure pel'-

tections al'8 incompatible t we

mwJ t

hold that evel'Y pure pel't80tion

must be compatible with evel'Y othel' pUl'e perteotion.

Tbi. oonse-

quenoe pl'e••r ...e. the detinition ot a pUl'e pertection.

Having til'S

shown that all pure perteotions are oompatible, we seoondly show
that e ...ery pure perteotlon is oompatible with inflnity_

To do

this, we would have to presupp08e that Infinity ia a posltlve perteotion or mode of belng aDd that notb1ng Gould exoeed that wh10h
is infinite.

Nov 1t a pure perfeotion were inoompatible wltb in-

tinity. it would be better than 1ntinity_

POI'

is better tban anything 1ncompatlble with it.

a pure pel'teotion
Btlt slnoe nothing

can exoeed the Infinite, a pure pertection oannot exoeed the inflnite and thel'atore must b. compatible with infinity.
i~.

oompatibilit1 ot all pure pertection. with eacb oth-

er and with inf1nity do •• constitute a proof acoording to Soo'us'
prinoiples of tbe possibilIty ot God.

POI' we have a.en Soottl' ar-

gue :from the oomposa1bili t1 ot infini t7 and being tOT!' a proot ot
the poa.ibi11ty ot God.

Both Pl'oot. presuppo.e that 1ntinity 1. a

p08itlv. pal'teotion or mod. ot being, even though
tbe infInite i8 by a negatiye detinit10n.

OUl'

knowle'" ot

the infinite la tha'

which exo••da the f1nl te not exaot11 by reason ot any t1n1te .....ure, but in exoe.. of any .e.aure tbat oould be a •• lgned.
even say that both Pl'oof's

&l'8

Hqu1red

1"01'

We __1

proving that tbe infi-

nite be1ng who po•• esse. all perteotions 1. p08s1ble.
b) Seoondly, Scotua and Leibniz try to estab11sh the

po,.

slbl1ity ot God by reterrlng to contIngent beIng.
One perluasive reason tbat Scotua otters tor the COmpOIalbility ot Intlnlty and being la tbe aotiylty ot intellect and
will.

Be apguea that jus' as the intellect can aeekaamething

greater than any tinite beIng becaus. the lntellect experlenoe.
Itself aa aeeklng more intelllgibility than tinit. beIngs exhibit

ot the.s.lve., so allO tbe will oan love ao.ethina peater- than
any tinite good beoaus. tlnlte good doe. DOt perfectll aatl.tl the
will.

Now it infln!te and good wer-e lncompatible and ao equiva-

lent to non-existence. the wll1 would hate an infInIte good Juat
as It

ntl tUI'alll

hates non-existenoe.

But the wIll do.s not bate

an Infinite good, but even a.mk. 1t sInce tbe wIll 18 not a.tlltIed in any tlnite good.

Theretor-e this tolloWI, tbat lnl1nlt.

aDd good are cOMpOlslble.

Another- per-suasIve re.aon tbat Scotua

ottera is the analogJ that it Intln1 t1 II posslble on the level

or

quantity .a potential, tben infinity ought to be possible on the
more pertect level ot beIng

and

.tricient causality.

Scotua also establish•• the polsibilitl ot the firat
.trlolent cau•• by a demonstration trom creaturel.

Thil demonatra·

tion or the possIbility ot tbe Flrlt Naturae with a triple primacy
in effloienoy. tinality. and eminenoe, does not enter explloitly

into the re-doing ot Ana.lm'l argument.

Pietx-o Higliore, O.P.M.

Oonv., believe. that tbe pe-dolns ot Anae1m'. al'gument tr-an.toNl
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the Anselmian argument into the thi~d Sootistio way.3

This thi~d

way 1s the argument whioh establishes the possibility or the most
pertect na ture.

It 1s very briefly stated by Sootus:

The first oonclusion is that 80me erainent nature is simpl,
tirst in perfection. This is ev1d~nt beoaus. an essential
o~d.r exists among •• s.no.s. tor .s Aristotle puts 1t. tapaa
are like numbera. And in such an order an ult1mate natu~e 1s
to be found. fbia i. proved by the tive reasona given above
tor a first being in the order of efficient causallty.4
Migliore otters tbretl reason. wh, the re-d01ng ot AM elm's argument makes the argument into the third way
the pos.ibility and actuality ot God.

~t

Scotus tor proYing

The first

r~ason

i. that

ScOtu8 re-doe. the argument in the context ot a consideration 01"
the eminence of the First Nature.

His second reason is that

800-

tus argues in the re-doing that the greatest Object oonoeiYable
without a oontradiction has an essential reality, !!A! gu14dltati~,

beoause in it the primary object of the intellect, namely

being, i. yerifled, and 1n the
perteot be1ng.

high~t

degree, namely as the moat

His third reason is that Scotus use. the .eoon4

conclusion ot the proof' trom etficiency in the re-dolng in ordel'
to show that the mo.t perteot being must aotually exist.
be contradictory to the notion

or

It would

the most perteat being that It

haYe the imperrection ot being caused.

Therefore the essence can-

) Pietro Migliore, O.P.M. aonv., "Aprlorismo Nella Dl~
o.trazione Scott.tica Dell'Esietenza Di Dio,· Miscellanea Frane.agana, LII, 1952, 360-361.
-

4
DuDa 800t118,

Orcll_1~.

48.

1, 4. 2, q. 1-2, II, 161, trana. Wolt••,
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not be only in the underltanding but must actually exist ot it •• lt
in order to pres.rve the statue 01' the .s ••noe as a possible.
There is nothing in Sooti.tio

ppincipl~a

which would forbid Mia-

liore from oonneoting the proot ot the possibility of the preeminent nature with the re-doing of Anselm'. argument.

Howyer ".

do not belieyethat Sootus intended auch a connection.

Migliore

18 misslng the signifioanoe ot tbe context in which Scotua tte-doe.
An ••lm'. argument.

The oontext .hows that Scotua is ottering pett-

.ua.i.e aPguments tor the oompOlsibillty 01' Intlrdty aDd b.lng, ot
InfinIty and good.

Then Jootus argues that in the sam. va,., An-

selm's 8J"gument _y be -oolotted.

This ",ame _,." ..... tope pri,

<

-.rlly • persuasl Ye at-gument tor the composslb11i ty 01' being, tbe
pnmary ob ject of the Intelleot. and Inf'lnl ty. the highest p08.ible desre. ot being.

EYen Scotus' u•• of' the .econd conclusion ot

the Pl'OOf' tJ"ODl etflolenoy doe. not make the re-dolrlg dependent upon that p1"00f tttOJl etrlaienoy.

We think that he uses tbat .econd

oonolu.ion -.i1111 as a comparison showing that Just as the intinite being 1I1U8t exl.t .inee It i. a contradiotion to ita nature
to be oau.. d,

10

alao tbe tirat ertioient call•• must exi.t because

It 18 a contradiotion to ita nature to be caused.
tel'S

Sootus then re-

to the second conolu.ion ot the proo1' 1'ttom • .trlclenoy beoaWle

he doe. DOt wlah to establlsh the conclusion agaln..5

Howeyep he

5 It il cleattly seen that the re-dolnga ot .Anselm·. attsu-nt do not depend on the proo1' trom e1'ticienoy sine. the .econd
l'e-doing establishes exi.tenoe by arguIng that Infinite aeing must
be able to be intulted.

67
could haYe pl'OYen his point by bolding 1h a.t it would be an imperrection tor tbe most perrect nature to be caused.
Althougb M1gl1ore do.. not se•• to be oorrect in what
800tu. aotually aooomplishe. 1n the "-do1ng

or

Anselm'. argUllent,

we can la, tbat hi. interpretation 1. In acoord with the ppinolpl•• of Seotus _

There is no ct')ntradiction 1n connecting the

proots ot the possibility of the .irst Nature with tbe tplple primacy with the re-doing ot An.elm'. apgument.

We may

conaide~

the

demonstration of the pos.ibility ot the tir'st e :rtlcient cau.e to
be a demonstration ot the pos.ibll1t, ot the infinite b.ina, alnoe
Scows t proof

or

tbe infinity or the tlrat being is tound.ect upon

the .SSInce or the tlrat being, DOt on its existence.
bpieny describe tbe proot troa etticienoy_

We_7

Scotua stuts with

the possibility ot something being etticiently caused.

This belng

ls either caused by itaelt or by nothing or b7 something other
than itselt.

Since It _nnot. be oau.ed by It ••lt and aln08 noth-

ing oause. nothing, tb. po •• 1bl11ty ot .ometb1ngbe1ng caused :require. tbe possibllity ot an efficient cau...

Eltber tMs poaal-

ble oau.. 1s tbe tirst po.slble efficlent cause or- it is a dependent cause.

It it 18 a depenc1ent cause, then ult1mately we lIlWIt

conclude to the first possible efficient cau•• because of the !apo.sibillt,. and unintelligibility of an inf'lnlty of e.sential17
ordered causes.

6 0

6

Seoau.e this cause is able to produce ita .tteot

1. d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 1$1-161.
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independently, that ls, because thls cau.e i. first, it i8 totally
uncausable. 7
Leibniz has an argument s1milar to Scotus t demonstration
01' the po •• iblllt1 of the tirst efficient cause.

Lelbniz argue.

trom tbe po •• ibillt7 ot contingent being to the possibility ot the
•• 0 ••••l'1

Seing.

We have summarised hi. reasonlng as tollow8:

It the n.c•••• ry being 1& impo.sible, all contingent beings
would be Impossible.
But so. . oonting.nt being ls possible.
Theretore the necessar1 being i. pos.ible.
The . . jor premise ls evident b1 the interence that contingent be-

ings oan tind the sufficient reason of their existenoe only in the
neces.ary being.

Although Leibniz phra.e. the major in terms at

01' possibility, the major i. evident only by a proot of the aotual

existence or the nec.s.ary being.

The minor prem1 •• i. known

eitbt" by an analysis 01' the concept ot a oontlngent thlng or by
d.lscovering that the thlng actual11 ex1sts or bas exlsted.

It the posslbility ot a contingent belng is known by an

I.

analY8i. of th. concept 01' being, then Leibniz'. argument 1 • • imilar to his proot tor God
trutha.

exi.tence tram the re.llty ot eternal

Just as lt 1s 8l1tt1c"ient to make an ana11si8 ot a concept

to ahow the pc •• ibi11ty 01' contingent being, so also it 1. sutticient tor him to make an analysis ot a concept to .how the r •• l1t1

ot an eternal truth.
7

And Just as there 1s an interence trom the

qrd1nat10, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 162-164.
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poasibll1t,. ot oontlngent belns to the possibility ot th& neoessary being,

.0 also there 1. an inrerenoe from the reality or

eternal truths to the Supre. lUnd which 18 GOd.

Por Lelbnis is

certain that hi. mind knows an eternal truth and that the ground

at this oertainty lie. in the ideas them.elve., independently or
the .enaes.

An ultimate ground ot this certaintr ot eternal

truths is required whloh oannot tail to exist.
gI-011nd

ot tru ths 1. the Mind ot God.

This ultimate

:rhe proofs trom oontingeno1

and from eternal trutha are basioaU,. the ame alnoe they both

start with the realIty involved 1n the possible. or essenoel.
It the ainor premis. which a.aerta the possibility ot
contlnglllt being is lmoWl'l, not by an analy.is or a concept, bu'
by disoovering that something existent is contingent, then the
P1"Obla mult be %tailled how he know. that this existent is contingent.

To anawer that proble., ve mu.t note that hi. theory of

truth is that eve'1!'1 predicate, Deoe ••• l'7 or contingent, is included in the idea or the subject.

In truths ot reasoning, the

predioate i8 necessarily and expressly oontained In the notion of
ita SUbject, and the oppOSite ot the truth i. tapos.ible sinoe the
opp08ite would expre.S a oontradiotion.

But in truths of tact,

the predi cate 1. oontingcmtly and impliol tly conta1ned in the notion of it. subject, and the opposite

or

the truth 18 posslble

s100e the opposlte would not express a oontradiotion.

Lelbni&

bold. that an existent i8 contingent because he oannot demonstrate
that the oppOSite

or

the existent im.pli.s a contradiotion.

Only
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God can n.lB.ke the 1n:f'inl te analY1Jls required to examine all the
possibles and their relationships to know why a particular easena
would contribute to the best possible

WOlt"'.

We have sUlDIQAl"ize4 and compared- the arguments ot Scotus
and Leionlz for the po,sibi11t,. ot God.
problelllt

They have ralsed the

"Oan ve know the possibIlity ot God? U

W. wll1 now dis-

cuss thia problem by evaluating the uguments which they have ottereds

a) by a oonoeptual anal,.lIla or the concept at God, and b)

by reterring to oontingent being• .
a)Sootua and Lelbn1s tr-y to prove God'. poaaibillt,. bY'

an analysi. of t.he conoept ot God.
i. demonet:ratl ..e.

Scows holds that his argumen

W. belie.,. that Sootul hold. hi. proot as per-

suaalve because ot the dl.tinct!on he makes between logIcal and
Nal pasalbl1l t11
A 10gloal pOI sIble i. a way ot composItion tor.med by the intellect ot that whoae terma do not inol ucla a contradIction••
•• But a real possible 1s that vhiQh ia accepted rrom so. .
potency inhering in something • • • • H

aecause he makes this distinction. his re-c1oing of the ontolo&loa
argument doe. not demonstrativelY' ahow the

~.al

possibility, that

ls, the real composslbillt,-, of the lnfinite beinc.
rejected an,- prgateE
Infinite belng.

~

A erop\er

Scotua baa

demonstration ot the pos.lbl11t,- of the
~

demonstration would show po•• ibil-

itY' by rinding a nece •• arr conneotion between the terma IntinitJ

8 Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4; II, 282.

11
and. being.

Thi. neoessary connection would have to be round by

an analysis of the term. infinity and being.

But Scotul admitted

in the context of the re-doing that no propter guld or

~

priori

analysis could tind a necessary oonneotion between inflnity and
being.

The re-doing by the analys1s or the ooneept o:f intin1 te

being only establi.he. logioal possibl1lty.
Although only logical possibility is establlshed, Scotu
believes that he has persuasively .stablished the possibility of
the inf'ln1te being.

We must further evaluate hi. proof.

following Inooherenoe. are the •• :
s~ptlon ~hat

(1) Saotus make.

~he

The
key a.w

the oompo •• ibility o:f infinity and being i. to be

pre.w.d it incompatibillty Is not evident.
the assumption i. not unreasonable.
a.sumptlon is unreasonable.

Sootus thinks that

However, it appear. that the

It only the Divine B,ing must exl.t

I t Be is po•• ible, then to assume that He ls possible 1s to make

a very gl'ea t assumption.
un:reascmable.

A very gr.a t as sumption :may very well b

(2) The infinite ls not positively understood, we

have no Jroper oonoept ot the essenoe of God.

For' Scotus defines

tbe infinite as that which exceed. the :finite, not exaotly by
reason or any finite measur'e. but 1n excess of an,. measure that
could be a.slgned.

~om

suCh a negative de:fIn1tIon. it i. 4iffi-

cult to determine whether or not actual Inflnity in being ls posslble.

tn Scotus arsue. that finite does not appear

attribu~e

coextensive with being.

to

be an

Por the attribute tinite-inti-

nit. i. a disjunoti"e attribute ot being.

However, Sootal bolds
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as a universal rule that b,. positing the less perteot extreme we
can conolude that the m:n.'e perfeot extreme ls realized in some
other belng.

But since we can only conclude by a reasoning pro-

oe.s from some finite being that some Inflnite being en.ts,sco-

tua 18 assuming what he should prove when he assumes that flnlte
is not an attribute co-extenalve wlth being.
The Sootl.tio and Lelbnlalan argament for the compatibillty or oompossibilit,. ot all pure pertections is more dittloul1
to evaluate.

Apparently, this argument holds that we

.0

have

knowledge ot pertections existing in this limited world that we
can abstraot the perfections t:rom their limited exiatence.

For

example. we can have knowledge ot the pertection ot intelleotual
knowledge.

We know that sense knowledge cannot be a pure pertec-

tion, one which oan exist unlimited, because aena. knowledp 1.
bound up with the.ooncrete, singular, material world.

We know

that manl. intelleotual lmowledSe baa the imperfeotion ot go1ng
trom potency to aot.

However when man Is intellect 1s in act and

knows the easenoe ot 8ometh1ng, we know that the intellect l

•

aot

i. not l1m1ted by th1s material world aa the act of Mnse knowledge ls limited.

Atter such an anal,.sia ot a pure perteotlon &ftC

attero haYing proYen that God exists and that pure perfections .u81
be predicated ot God, we then make an analogous predlcatlon that
God i. knowledge In the most perteot way_

What the Sootistic and

Lelbniaian argument wanta to do, however, is simply to argue troM
the compossibility of all pure perteotion. with themselv•• and
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with infinity that God i . pos.ible.

We may us. Scotus l d1.tinction ot logioal and

~eal

po.si-

bility and evaluate the proot ot the compatIbllity of the pure pertections .s establishing only 10gioal possibility.
atll1 thinks such an argument gIves
enoe can b. interred.

&

However

aoo~.

possibility :from which eu.t.

We can makeu closer analysis of the argu-

Sootu. I argument that the pure pertections are mutually

ment.
patlble

d~enda

00...

upon hi. deflnl tlon of a pure perteotion as that

wh1ch Is sImply and absolutely better than an1tb1ng inoompatible
wi th it.

It two pure pertections were mutuall,. incompatible, then

each would bave to be greater than the other and le.8 than the

er.

o~

To avoid that contradiotion, 800tus holds that the pure per-

teotions ax-e oompatible.

The argwtlOllt i. valid, but the truth ot

the oono1usion depends upon the truth of the definition ot a pu.e
perfection.

Must we aooept the definition ot a pure pertection?

It appears that we do not bavf!' to accept that the definit10n i.

true, tha t 1., that t thl definltion baa an objective correlate 1n
the existent world.

'or tne only perfections we know are perte..

t10ns whioh are limited, conditioned.

How do we know that the ab-

stracted definition of a pure perfection has an objective reterenoe

until we have

prov~n

that such a pure per-tection aotually e%1lt.?

SoOtU8 'WOuld object that we onl:r have to prove that the definition

ot a pure perfection 1. derived from the real world and that 1t 1.
wi thout oontradiction.

The non-contradiction shows p08s1b11i ty,

and existenoe would be interred tro. possibility.

Howver in

l."e-
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sponae to the objeotion of Sootus. we can otfer this distinotion.

If there exlstean omnipotent God, and it omnipotence consists In
the power to px-oduce whatever doe. net involve an Intex-nal oontradie tlon, then the ab senoe ot internal centrad! otion in the defini-

tion ot a pure p«rteotion
possible .S BUehl-

do~s

prove that the pure perteotlon 1.

Bu t it ....e dO' no t presuppose the existenoe ot

divine omn1.potenoe, then the absenoe
the

de~lnl tion

or

internal oontradiotion in

of a. pl.ll'e p@rt'"ec,t1on prov•• no more than the coher-

ence ot an Objeot of thought. 9
There i . aDOtheI- weakness 1n both, $ootul' and Leibn1z'.

proofl that a pure pertection 1s compatible wi tb Inflni tJ.

The

Intinite i. detiDed negat1vely, by rererenoe to fin1te being.

We

have no proper concept of the essence ot' vha t would be flotu.),l,. 1n..
tin! te.

With ow- conoept ot intin1 t1 "e oould anl,. suesa as to the

possi b111 ty ot the Intlnl te b&lng. or as to the posslblli ty ot the

pure pertection, intinite knowledge.
b) Scotua and Lelbniz try to p:rove God·. pos.IbIllty by
rete~lng

to contingent being.

The .. arguments

a%'ed1tt1oul~

to

evaluate.

The persuasive argument ot Saotus trom the activIty ot
the intellect and will doe. not appear to be tallaclous.

Por h.

arguea that the intellect .eeks more Intel11g1bl11t,. than 1"in!t.

9 Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Inaisht, lew York, 1961, 611.
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being giYes and that the will seeks more good than tinite being
oan give.

8'1 saying that the intellect seeks to understand more

than tinite beings, Sootus may mean that a tinite, caused being 1.

not intelligible ot Itailt but requires its oorrelative, an uncau.ed caua., which makes tt. cau.ed being intelligible.

Hove ...e.-

we do not think that Sootus mean. that; rather Sootua aeans that
the Intelleot and will arte seeking their ends in infinite t:ruth

and goodness.

But it ScotU8 means that the intelleot and will hay.

a natur-al. d •• ire tor the intin1te trtuth and good, there se ... to
be an inoonsiatenoy in his. thought, slnoe the desire to 11••
ev.. is slJ1l11ar to the desire tor the int1.n1 te good.

tOl'-

Per Sootua

argue. that an argument trom naturtal d.sire begs the question:
It the argument i. based on the notion ot natural de.ir'e take!
in an exaot and proper .enae, and a natural deslre in this
.ens. i. not an eliolted act but merely an inolination ot nature towards something, then it i8 cleal" tha t the existenc. oj
suOb a natural. desire tort anything can be proyed only it v.
pro.. tirst that the nature 1n quea tion i. able to haYe auch
a thing. To argue the other vay round, theretore, is begging
the question. Or it natural desire ia taken in a lea. proper
senae, .iz. as an aot elioited in contormity with the natural
inolination, we are .till unable to proye that any 811cited
dellre il natural in thl. senae V1tbout :first pl"Ovlng the
existenoe of a natural desire in the proper .ense ot the
term. 10
W. would tirst have to P1'Oft according to Sootul that the 1ntlnit.
being exists and is 1'elated to man as the ultimate tlnal cause.
Then he says that we know that mants desl1'. top th. infinite good

10 itamis!!y!!!' Sootl.. 0Eera Omnia, ed. Vi"•• , Lib. IV
Sententiarum,
III, q. 2, If, 63b.
.
---
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is a natural desire.

So Sootus thinks th*t every argument based

on natural desire is inoonolusive.

We do not see how we oan reoon

cile the proot ot the co.possibility ot infinity and being with t
rejection ot any proot ot immortality

rro.

natural de.ire.

There

doe. not aee. to be any point in oalling the proot persuasive ot
compossihility and also inoonolusive ot oomposaibility.
Scotus otfers another persuasive argument:

an analogy

that it infinity is possible In quantity, then Infinity i.
in being and etfio1ent oausal1ty.

The analogy seems weak.

tinity in the division ot quantity i. never actual, but only poten
iial.

However, Sootu. ass.rts 1n the analogy that just ..s intin1

is not opposed to quantity potentially, so neither is in!1nity opposed to being and etricient oausality in an ac tual way.

Because

it is possible, that 18, not oontradiotory, to have an aotually in
tinite number ot etteota realised successively, tor example, in an
eternal motion, Sooius can oonclude that the infinite cause ot
the .. etteots is possible.

Now it there exists an omnipotent God_

and it omnipotence consists in the power to produoe whatever doe.
not involve an internal contradictIon, then the absenoe ot interna
contradiction in the idea ot an infinite number ot suocessive ettects does prove that ihe infinity in ettects i. po.sible.

There-

tore Scotus oan oonclude that tbe proper cause of these ettect. i.
po.sible.

But it we do not presuppose the existenoe ot divine om-

nipotenoe, then the ab.enoe ot internal oontradiotion in the'ide.

ot an intinity in succe.sive etrects pro.e. no more than the cober

11
enoe ot an objeot of thought.

Therefore the real possibility ot

God is not establIShed.
The argument ot Scotus tor the first possible erticient
oause appears to be valid.

The rea.on tbat Sootus pl'Ove. the pos-

.ibillty of the Fir.t Nature is that Soctus starts with the po •• lbl1lty ot something being cau.ed.
a neo •• sary

pre~ ••

Scotua doe. so in ord«r to have

about an es.enoo or pos.ible which doe. not

consider the essence .s contingently existing.

Scotus believes

that it is nece.aary that a man 1. pOlsible beoause there is no
contradiction in the quiddity ot man, that it is necesaary that a
man 1. pOllible because the possible being bas its possibility
trom Its own quiddity.
Sootus.

We have to disagree with this reason ot

For It we do not presuppose tlw existence of' divine omni-

potence, then the absence ot internal contradic tlon in the quiddity of man proves no

mON

than tbe coherence ot an obJ_ct ot

It is only necessary that man can be 1t God existl.

though~ i"-

However, we

are able to know another way that it 18 necessarY' that a man can
be.

It we know that a man exists, then while we know thi., it is

neoe •• arily true that a man exist..

SimilarlY'. while we know that

this man extsts, it il necessarily true tbat this man is able to
exist, i.e., that he is po.sible.

Sootus could have round a nec-

essary premise about a contingent existent, but be did not rind
such a premia..

ne

thought he had round a necessary premil. about

the po.sibllitY' or someth1ng being caused, but hi. pre.upposltiolUl
tor necessity were weak.

Howev.. we have found a way to support
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his premise that it i. neoessarily true that something i8 po.slble.
Pep while we know that a man exists or that something is being
oaused, it Is neoessarily true that something oan be oau.-d.
we may start with the apprehension

or

Tbus

real possibility without be.
Therefore, because ot the

sinning with the exiatent a. exiatent.

impossibility and unintelligibility ot an infinity ot essentlally
ordered

cau~el,

the rea.l possibility ot something being oaused re-

quires the real possibility ot the first uncauaable efficient
cause.

Theretore we can demonstrate the possibility ot God.
Leibnls". proof ot the possibility ot the Necessary Be.

ing appears to be tallacious.

Pol" be argue.:

It the neoe.sary being i. impossible, all oontlngent beings
would be impossible.
But some contingent belng is possible.
Theretore the necessary being is possible.
The _jor premise 1. evident only by proving that the actual exist.

enoe ot oontingent beinga d.pends upon the existenoe of the Neces.ary aeing.

The weakness ot the argument Is that the aotual exi.t.

ence ot God i . implied in the _ jor; theretore, ot course, the con..
clusion tollows that God i. possible.

And so the conolusion prove.

le •• than the major premis. Assumes for its proof in LeIbnlz'a
tru. tment.

There is another weakness to the argument.

ness ls Le1bniz la notion of oontingenoy.

He

'l'h1s weak-

hold.s that an ex1a'en1

limited being i . oontingent because his knowledge tinds no oontradiotion in the ter.ns in predloating non-existenoe ot a l1mIted .a.ence.

Lelbniz makes contingenoy more a fac t ot my knowledge ot
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being; the question corJld very well be asked whether or not beings
must correspond to my knowledge.
Leibn1s's proof ot that conditional syllogism is tallaclous.

But his 81110g1s. can be proven bJ Scotus without tallacy.

'or the

mino~

premise that lome contingent being ls possible can

be known !'rom aotual experience ot 80me exiatent being which perlshes, but not trom an analysia of the concept of a being.

':Chen

we would know tha t some

it

would be a

~equlsite

con~ingent

being was po.sible.

Now

oondition ot the real possibIlity of aame oon.

tingent being that aome n.cessarr being be really possible.

POI"

it aomethillg oan be caused, something must be able to cause that

being; and beoause of the impossibility 01' an infinite serie. ot
essentially

ord~r.d

oauses, 80Me first cause must be possible.

That .18 what the major premise 01' Leibniz can assert 1n terms ot
impossibility:

it the necessary being i. impossible, the contin-

gent being is possible.

a.

The ayllog1s. ot te1bn1z can be understooj

aimply casting Scotus' argument into a conditional sylloSis••
We have examined and evaluated the arguments ot ScotWi

am L.1bniz ror the possibi11 t1 of God.

A key point in their argu-

ments is the distinct10n between the real or possible being and
existent being.

Scotus d1stingUish•• between 10g1cal poasibl1it7

and reAl po.sibility. but Leibnis holds th ••• tl«) possibilities
are

01'

.qual strength In an argument.

But Scotus doea not attrib-

ute eq,ual .trength and holds that an argument trom the really possIble as known from an existent can demonstrate the real po.albil.

80
ity or God.

Be holds the arguments from logical posslbility to be

only persuasive and the argument trom the activity ot the 1ntelleo
and will as seeking the infinite good as persuasive.
argument

w.

The stronses

bay. acoepted tor God's possibility Is our Interpreta-

tion ot Sootus t proof trom efficiency_

We will now discWls and e-

valuate the arguments establisbina God's existence from Bis possibility.
2) Interence.!£gm

~

Possibility 9..!.

~.i9.

m..

Aotual Existence

Scot us argue. tram the possibility ot the firat unoausable etfioient cause to It. actual existence, an4 be argues trom
the compossibility of intinity and being that the infinite being
actually exists.

Wi th regard to the first ertioient cause, he ar-

gues tbat anything, to whose nature It is contrad1otory to reoeive
ex1stence from something else, exists of 1tselt, it 1t is able to
exist at all.

Since it ls contradictory tor the tirst uncausable

efficient cause to be caused by receiving existence trom another,
the flrst possible efficlent cause must exlst ot itselt since it
was proven to be a real possible which guarantees the real possibility ot something being able to be caused.

With regard to the

campo.sible intinlte being, Scotus has two arguments.

First, he

argues that it is contradiotory to the notlon ot 1nfinite being
that it be oaused by another to exist.

Theretore, the oompossible

infln1te belng mu.t have aotual existenoe in order to preserve its
status aa a posaible.

Sootus' seoond argument is that it the inti
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nite being did not actually exist, It would not be able to be Intuited, but then its non-exlstenc. would contradiot tbe eas.ntial
reality 01' the possible which ought to be able to be intuite4.
Sinoe the possible reality 01' the infinite being oannot be contradicted, the in.t"in1te being must actually exist.
In making the transltion from posslbl1ity to aotual
exlstenoe, Sootus remarka that to oonoeive a thing as exlsting
do •• not mean that that tblne 1. ooncelved to .. greater .xtent.

But beoauae .. po.alble whicb do•••xl.t ls greater than anything
el.. whloh 1. solely

in

the Int.lleot, what .xlats in reallty ls

conceivably greater tban what _xlst. only In the Intellect.
Leibn1z also argues that it God, the being poasessing
all pertections, i. po •• lble, He must exist.

For exiatenoe Is a

perteotlon; hence the beIng po •••• slng all pertections, who •• pos.
albl1ity was established in the

~

priori proot ot the oompatib1li.

ty ot all pure perfectiona, must posseaa the perrection 01' exl.tenoe.

Lelbniz'. basio criterion tor judging lotlether or not exl.t-

ence 1s a pex-t'eotlon i. that existeno. 1. a perteotlon 11' it inoreases the reality 01' the thing oonoeived.

Bow he atflrms that a

thing ooncei ved as exlstlng baa IIOre reall t7 than the same thins
oonoeived as possible.

In tbe demonstration trom oontingenoy whicb 11 to Ibow
tbe po.albl11t,. ot' the neoe.sary being, It 1& erldent to Leibn.1z
tbat the po •• lb111t7 or es.enc. ot the necessary being .eana that

1t necessai-I1,. does exl at of 1 t"elf •
i

.

82
'.the prin01ple that \ore will use to evaluate the argument.
tor the existenoe of God 1s that His exis tenoe oan be known onl,.
in oonneotion wi th _n's intelleotual and sensible knowledge of

the exlstent world.

There tore , the only valid argu.m.en.t is Scotu. t

demonstration of the possibilit, and actuallty
clent cause.

or

the tirst effl-

For he started w1 th the real possibility of some-

thing being oaus.d .s experienoed trom the changeable, GAuaabl.
existent world.

assume

All the oth4tr arguments are inval1d ainoe the,.

pos~lbilit1

becau ••

1~osslbillt1

1s not evident.

Suoh

po •• ibility is onlv logioal and proves 01'111 the coherenoe of an ob

No exlstenoe oan be interred trom 10gloal po •• i-

jeot or thought.
billty_
The~.

position.

ls

o~e

objeotion vh1cb might be raised against our

The obj.ctor would sal·that, once the world ot exlstano

ls lett and we enter the realm of the possible (e •• eno.s whioh can
be), we must remaln in the po •• lble world.
tinction.

Our answer i ... dis-

it we enter the world of logical po.sibility, then ve

oannot Inter existenoe: but it we know real po.sibillty through
our experience of wbat actually i8, then we can int.r the existence of that whioh nece •• arily guarant ••• that real pos.ibillty_
It the objeotor 8&Y'. that
mu..t SimplY' diaagr.e.

1'••1

pos.ibility .eaDa nothIng, then we

It is _anlngtul and it . .ana aore than

simply the abaeno. ot internal contradiotion to -'1 that the .xist
ent world 1a posaible, since it do •• actually extst.

11 ia, can b..

What aotual-

Th•••••no. whicb exi.ta ia an ••••no. which can

8,3

be.

w.

wish to make clear that our emph.a..'3is on the reality

ot possibillty or e,senee doe. not mean that we tr$at existence .a
a oonsequenoe of essenoe.

Wo agree vith Sootu. that a possible

which exists is greater than anything el.o which i . solely in th.

intell.ct.

And we agree with Leibniz tha. t the existent thing has

t'110l"'e reality than the same thing conoeived as onl,. possible.
art.!" not sa,.ing that existenoe i. to be conce! ved.

We

Existence in

this world is known by the judgment intellectuall" not as a concept.

It might seem that we treat existence as a consequent ot

e •• enoe when we infer that God ex18ts because we know His po •• lbil

ity.

W. are not laying that Hi. existenoe tlow. from Hi. e ••enoe.

Rather we are saying that the only way that God oan be really po.-

sIble 1s that He nec.ssaril,. exists ot Himse1t.

Hi. essenoe is

His existence.
W. have accomplished our task ot describing, comparing,

and .... luat1na the

attitud~

ontological argument.

ot Dun. SootWJ and Leibnlz tovard the

~lg1nall1,

the thesia waa planned to be

only a desoription and comparison, howeveF. the opportunity bas
b.en taken to discuss the philosophical problaa which Scotua and
Leibniz have raisedl

"Elan we know the possibility pt God?

it" so, can we in..fer His eXistence trom His possibilltTl"

And

In their

ontological arguments, Scotus and Lelbn1z are aware that they are
arguing from the oonoept of God to the exlstenoe ot God.
ha. .

oaretull,. tried to Juatlfy the reality ot the ooncept

They
o~God
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and the validity of the
enoe.

The

a~guments

inf.~.no.

trom poasibillty to aotual exl.,

most d1f'tloult to rejeot wre:

the argument

of' Sootua tor the real oompoasibllity of' all pure perteot19na, and
the argument tram the strivIng of the will for the Infinite Good.
The onlT argument whlch we have aooepted as provIng God'. po.slbil
1t1 is Scotu.a' .! Rosteriod demonstratlon from. etrl01.noy.
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